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Abstract 
The Basel III Capital Accord was introduced as a regulatory response to the financial 
crisis. Lack of sufficient capital requirements for banks was an important lesson learned 
after several financial institutions went bankrupt.  By strengthening the balance sheet of 
banks, the Basel III Accord aims to prevent future crisis and bank distress. 
 
When banks’ regulatory environment is changed through increased capital 
requirements, they are forced to adapt their behavior. The object of this thesis is to 
examine how Norwegian banks in general and specifically the DNB Bank Group, has 
adapted to a situation where its capital ratios are becoming increasingly constrained by 
regulation. The ultimate aim of the thesis is to study whether the DNB Bank Group is 
able to fulfill the new capital requirements being introduced gradually towards 1 July 
2016 without issuing equity. 
 
An analysis of the Norwegian banks’ behavior in the period 2009-2013 indicates that 
banks have primarily adapted to the increased capital requirements through issuing 
equity capital or retaining earnings. The analysis shows that Norwegian banks are on 
the track to fulfilling the capital requirements set by the Norwegian Ministry of Finance.  
 
In order to conduct an in-depth analysis, a case study of the DNB Bank Group was 
conducted. The bank has implemented several measures which strengthens the balance 
sheet. Through an analysis of the DNB Bank Group’s financials, projected until the 
second quarter of 2016, I can conclude that given the assumptions applied in the 
baseline case, the bank is able to fulfill the capital requirements without having to issue 
equity. 
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Introduction 
 
In the fall of 2008 the world witnessed the outbreak of the worst financial crisis since 
the Great Depression of the 1930s. The collapse of the international financial markets 
caused a severe cyclical downturn with sharply rising unemployment and significant 
welfare cuts in many countries. The extensive damage to the global economy brought 
renewed attention to international banking regulation. In 2010 the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision issued the third Basel Accord as a regulatory response to the 
financial crisis. The main features of the new international regulatory framework are 
higher capital requirements and stricter standards for high-quality capital in banks. The 
Committee aims to improve the loss-absorbing capacity of banks, thereby reducing the 
risk of spillover effects from the financial sector to the real economy.  
 
When banks’ regulatory environment is changed through increased capital 
requirements, they are forced to adapt their behavior. The approach taken to adjust to 
capital pressure varies with the business cycle and the banks’ financial situation. During 
booms, banks might find it easy to raise equity capital and potential earnings retentions 
will be high. During downturns, with declines in credit demand and increased losses, 
banks may prefer to reduce lending. In general, banks respond to capital ratio pressure 
in the manner they believe to be most cost effective, which may vary substantially (BIS, 
1999).  
 
Norway was among the first countries to introduce the third Basel Accord. Several banks 
have issued equity after the Norwegian implementation plan was approved in June 2013, 
with the final date of implementation being July 1st 2016. The new regulatory 
framework has received ample attention by the media and Norway’s largest bank and 
financial services provider, DNB, has been featured frequently in the newspapers. The 
bank has been criticized for making its customers pay for the capital build-up through 
increased interest margins, while investors reap the profits. Furthermore, the bank’s 
CEO has stated that the DNB will not issue equity to fulfill higher capital requirements. 
Norwegian regulators are concerned that the reluctance to issue equity will result in 
reduced lending, which could harm economic growth.  
 
 5 
 
In this thesis I will examine the DNB Bank Group, which represents DNB’s bank facilities. 
I will look into how the bank has adapted to a situation where its capital ratios are 
becoming increasingly constrained by regulation. Moreover, the future development in 
the capital adequacy of the DNB Bank Group is projected with the aim of analyzing the 
bank’s ability to build required capital. The objective of the research and analysis is 
ultimately to answer the following research question; Will the DNB Bank Group be able 
to meet the capital requirements by July 1st 2016 without issuing equity? 
 
Limits in scope  
An addition to the third Basel Accord is a set of liquidity requirements that complement 
the capital requirements and aims to strengthen bank’s liquidity.  For the purpose of 
answering the research question I find it reasonable to limit the scope of the thesis to 
the capital requirements of the Basel accords. The liquidity requirements will thus not 
be evaluated.  
 
It should be noted that the analysis was concluded before the DNB Bank Group’s first 
quarter financials was released on May 8th 2014. The financials for the first quarter of 
2014 is thus forecasted as a part of the projection period in the model. 
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Structure 
The thesis consists of three main parts; bank regulation and supervision (part 1), the 
Norwegian banking sector (part 2) and a case study of the DNB Bank Group (part 3).  
 
Part 1 provides an introduction to the role of banks and why banks are regulated. In 
addition this section offers a brief overview of the Bank of International Settlements, 
followed by a more detailed explanation of the three Basel accords, both in an 
international and Norwegian context. 
 
While the international backdrop is provided in Part 1, Part 2 focuses solely on the 
Norwegian banking sector and covers the key interest rates, market structure, bank’s 
funding composition and the key drivers of earnings. The development in the capital 
adequacy of Norwegian banks is studied and evaluated. In order to be able to analyze 
the adaption to new capital requirements, the DNB Bank Group is chosen for an in-depth 
case study in part 3. 
 
Part 3 provides an introduction to the DNB Bank Group. The bank’s adaption to higher 
capital requirements is analyzed in a historical context first, followed by a projection of 
the bank’s financial from the fourth quarter of 2013 until the second quarter of 2016 
when the capital requirements are introduced in full.  
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1 Banking and Capital Adequacy 
 
1.1 The Role of Banks 
Are banks special? An essay on this question remains as relevant today as when it was 
written more than three decades ago. Gerald Corrigan (1982), who was then the 
President of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, argued that there are three 
characteristics that distinguish banks from all other classes of institutions – both 
financial and nonfinancial; banks offer transaction accounts, banks are the backup 
source of liquidity for all other institutions and banks are the transmission belt for 
monetary policy. Additionally, Mishkin (1991) argues that banks play a special role in 
the financial system because of their function in solving asymmetric information 
problems in credit markets. 
 
1.1.1 Issuers of Transaction Accounts 
A transaction account is a deposit account held by the bank for the purpose of securely 
and quickly providing frequent access to funds on demand through a variety of different 
channels. According to Corrigan (1983), the critical difference between banks and other 
classes of financial institutions rests with the capacity of banks to incur and to create 
liabilities that are payable on demand and that are readily transferable to third parties. 
The banks are partly funded by deposits that can be withdrawn instantly, while these 
deposits are invested in assets with maturity several years ahead. This is called maturity 
transformation and enables banks to provide long-term lending through short-term 
borrowing (Norges Bank, 2004).  
 
1.1.2 Backup Sources of Liquidity 
The financial markets are dependent on the banking system as their standby or backup 
source of credit and liquidity (Corrigan, 1983). Banks have the ability to supply credit 
and liquidity particularly in situations where other institutions or markets may be 
unwilling or unable to do so. They can carry out this function because the deposit 
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creating function of banks in tandem with their relationship with a lender of last resort1 
provides an element of credit and liquidity elasticity, which is not immediately available 
to other institutions. In the normal course and even in periods of stress, individual banks 
and the banking system as a whole are able to provide necessary liquidity because of 
their ability to quickly fund loans through a variety of market sources. 
 
1.1.3 Transmission Belt for Monetary Policy 
Corrigan (1983) states that the fact that banks are subject to reserve requirements 
places the banking system in the unique position of being the "transmission belt" 
through which the actions and policies of the central bank have their effect on market 
conditions, money and credit creation, and economic conditions generally. Even for 
banking systems that do not operate with required reserves, the interest payments 
made by the central banks on the reserve balances of banks, makes the reserves an 
important part of monetary policy. The reserves in the banking system also serve the 
complementary purpose of providing the working balances, which permit the financial 
markets to function and to effect the orderly end-of-day settlement of the transactions 
that occur over the course of each business day (Corrigan, 1983). 
 
1.1.4 Solution to the Asymmetric Information Problem 
According to Mishkin (1991), banks play a special role in the financial system because 
they are especially well suited to solve asymmetric information problems in credit 
markets. Borrowers have an informational advantage over lenders because borrowers 
know more about the investment projects they want to undertake. This informational 
advantage results in adverse selection and the classic lemons problem, first described by 
Akerlof (1970). A lemon problem occurs in the debt market because lenders have 
trouble determining whether a borrower is a good customer, who has good investment 
opportunities with low risk, or a bad customer who has poorer investment projects with 
high risk. If the lender cannot distinguish between the borrowers of good quality and 
those of bad quality, the lemons, loans will only be made with interest rates that reflect 
                                                        
1 A lender of last resort is a lender, typically a central bank, which provides banks with funds when they 
cannot borrow from the market. The availability of such lending is intended to prevent systemic problems 
due to liquidity shortage in individual institutions (OECD, 2013).  
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the average quality of the good and bad borrowers. Another possible outcome of 
adverse selection is that the lender wants to cut down the number of loans, which 
causes the supply of loans to decrease. This could lead to a decline in investment and 
aggregate economic activity (Mishkin, 1991). Banks are well suited to solve asymmetric 
information problems inherit in credit markets, as they have the expertise in collecting 
information about potential customers, and thus are better able to screen good 
borrowers from bad borrowers at a low cost.   
 
From the above discussion, the answer to Corrigan’s question is quite clear: Banks’ are 
special, and the important functions of banks make them essential to the functioning of 
an efficient financial and economic system.  
 
1.1.5 Why regulate banks? 
Bank creditors must have sufficient trust in banks’ ability to repay their debts for the 
banking system to work properly. Without trust, the banking system can go from being 
stable to becoming unstable in a very short amount of time (Borchgrevink, Søvik, & Vale, 
2013). This vulnerability arises because of maturity transformation. Investing short‐
term deposits in long‐term assets makes banks vulnerable to excessive deposit 
withdrawals, so-called bank runs. Deposit insurance and direct access to the lender of 
last resort, are regulations that can improve the market outcome. These facilities are 
uniquely available to banks to reinforce the public confidence (Corrigan, 1983). 
 
Banks are also vulnerable to other banks’ distress. When a bank is in the situation of not 
being able pay the full amount on its liabilities, the counterparties of the bank incur 
losses. This is direct contagion of financial distress. Also, if one bank incurs unexpected 
losses it will tend to reduce lending and hence reduce the supply of funding through the 
interbank market (Borchgrevink, Søvik, & Vale, 2013). This tightens the funding supply 
to other banks, and may reduce the lending from these banks as well. The banking sector 
is interconnected, meaning that banks tend to have many and large exposures to other 
banks. In order to apply the necessary measures for safety and soundness, regulators 
must monitor risks at the macro level and implement regulation measures to address 
vulnerabilities at the system level. 
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The interconnectedness between bank credit and the real economy strengthens the 
importance of bank regulation. In the event that large, interconnected banks fail to meet 
their financial obligations, the consequences on the real economy could be devastating. 
With increasing losses, banks’ ability to provide credit is weakened. Households and 
businesses postpone investment due to lack of access to credit, and economic activity 
drops. Lower economic activity and increased unemployment may in turn cause 
borrowers to have trouble servicing their debt. This further increases bank’s losses, and 
the negative spiral continues.  
 
The likelihood of a government rescue increases with the probability of spillover effects 
that could damage the real economy. Because of this, banks, and especially large banks, 
have an implicit government guarantee. Expectations of government support give 
shareholders, and in turn bank managers, incentives to choose more risky portfolios and 
higher leverage. With deposit insurance in place, the depositors have weak incentives to 
monitor their banks. Even more professional creditors might not have full incentive to 
monitor banks because they expect that the government will guarantee the bank’s debt. 
These moral hazard2 issues, deposit insurance and government guarantee, entail higher 
than optimal risk in banks (Borchgrevink, Søvik, & Vale, 2013). As recently witnessed, 
banks with risky portfolios and high leverage are the first to experience increasing 
losses during market downturns.  
 
Banks are special institutions and their importance in society makes the need for 
regulation evident. The interconnectedness of the banking sector and the risk of 
spillover effects to the real economy in the event of bank failure point to the necessity of 
guidelines for banks’ risk-taking. Furthermore, it could be argued that the deposit 
insurance and the government’s incentive to keep banks afloat cause moral hazard 
problems that promote over-leveraged banks.  
 
The capital requirement forms the fundament of financial regulation because capital acts 
as a cushion to absorb unexpected losses, thereby keeping problems in the financial 
                                                        
2 When an agent undertakes actions that cannot be observed by other agents in the economy, and these 
actions confer risk on these other agents, it is called moral hazard (Borchgrevink, Søvik, & Vale, 2013). 
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sector from becoming problems in the real economy. Additionally, capital requirements 
will increase the capital lost in case of failure and are therefore expected to reduce the 
incentive to take on high risk (Borchgrevink, Søvik, & Vale, 2013). The Basel Committee 
on Banking Supervision has played a key role in establishing capital requirements for 
banks on an international level. International banking supervision and regulation will be 
addressed in the following.  
 
1.2 International Banking Supervision and Regulation 
1.2.1 The Bank of International Settlements 
The Bank for International Settlements (BIS) serves central banks in their pursuit of 
monetary and financial stability, encourages international cooperation in those areas 
and acts as a bank for central banks. Established in May 1930, the BIS is the world's 
oldest international financial organization (BIS (1), 2013). The BIS arrange regular 
meetings of Governors and senior officials of member central banks. Held every two 
months in Basel, these gatherings provide an opportunity for participants to discuss the 
world economy and financial markets, and to exchange views on topical issues of central 
bank interest or concern. The main result of these meetings is an improved 
understanding by participants of the developments, challenges and policies affecting 
various countries or markets (BIS (1), 2013). 
 
1.2.2 The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) was created by the G103 countries 
at the end of 1974 and is a part of BIS. BCBS consists of central bankers and finance 
ministers from 27 countries4, and provides a forum for international cooperation on 
banking supervisory matters. Its objective is to enhance understanding of key 
                                                        
3 The Group of Ten is made up of eleven industrial countries (Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, 
Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States), which consult 
and co-operate on economic, monetary and financial matters (BIS (3), 2013).  
 
4 Member countries: Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, Hong Kong 
SAR, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, Russia, Saudi Arabia, 
Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States 
(BIS (2), 2013). 
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supervisory issues and improve the quality of banking supervision worldwide (BIS (2), 
2013). 
 
John Connolly (2013), senior policy advisor and regulatory capital specialist at the 
Department of the Treasury in the US, states that the need for international banking 
regulations came with the internationalization of the financial markets. “An 
international banking sector needs an international regulatory coordinator, and the 
Basel Committee carries out that objective”. 
 
Since the first meeting in February 1975, meetings have been held regularly three or 
four times a year. An important objective of the Committee's work has been to close 
gaps in international supervisory coverage in pursuit of two basic principles; that no 
foreign banking establishment should escape supervision and that supervision should 
be adequate (BIS (2), 2013). The capital accords are the means to achieving this 
objective. The Committee does not possess any formal supervisory authority, and its 
conclusions do not have legal force (BIS (2), 2013). Rather, BCBS formulates broad 
supervisory standards and guidelines and leaves it up to individual authorities to 
implement them in a way best suited to their national systems. 
 
1.3 The Basel Capital Accords 
The Basel Capital Accords are recommended banking regulations, developed by BCBS. 
Since 1988 the BCBS has issued three capital accords known as Basel I, Basel II and 
Basel III. Basel I was implemented by member countries by 1992, Basel II is still being 
implemented in certain countries and Basel III is coming into effect gradually from 
January 1st 2014 in most member countries.  
 
1.3.1 Basel I 
The first Basel Capital Accord, known as Basel I, was introduced in 1988 and was the 
outcome of BCBS’ work over several years to secure international convergence of 
supervisory regulations governing the capital adequacy of international banks (BCBS, 
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1988). The objective of the system was to prevent regulatory arbitrage5, thereby 
providing an equitable basis for competition for banking institutions in participating 
countries (Connolly, 2013). Governments and international regulators were concerned 
that if countries did not cooperate in implementing standards, banks might prefer to 
domicile in countries with the most relaxed requirements. This would result in a 
competitive advantage for these banks, and potentially lead to a race to the bottom6 in 
banking regulation.  
 
Basel I laid out the details of the agreed framework for measuring capital adequacy and 
the minimum standard to be achieved, which the national supervisory authorities 
represented on the BCBS agreed to implement in their respective countries (BCBS, 
1988) 
 
1.3.1.1 The Constituents of Capital 
Tier 1 Capital  
Tier 1 (core) capital in Basel I consists of the most liquid and reliable capital on a bank’s 
balance sheet, namely equity capital and disclosed reserves (BCBS, 1988). 
 
Tier 1 capital includes (a) permanent shareholder’s equity in the form of common stock, 
perpetual non-cumulative preferred stock and minority interests in equity accounts of 
consolidated subsidiaries; (b) disclosed reserves such as retained earnings, share 
premiums or other surplus and (c) qualifying innovative capital instruments up to a 
maximum of 15 percent of Tier 1 capital. Goodwill is deducted.  
 
Tier 2 Capital  
Tier 2 (supplementary) capital in Basel I consists of less reliable capital then that of Tier 
1. 
 
                                                        
5 Regulatory Arbitrage is a practice where firms capitalize on loopholes in regulatory systems in order to 
circumvent unfavorable regulation, for example through relocation (Investopedia, 2013) 
6 Race to the Bottom is the idea that if one country provides an advantageous regulatory environment, 
other countries must weaken their regulation in order to provide a competitive basis for business, which 
leads to reduced regulation everywhere.  
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Tier 2 capital includes (a) undisclosed reserves that have been accepted by the bank’s 
supervisory authority; (b) general loan-loss reserves limited to 1.25 percent of risk-
weighted assets; (c) hybrid (debt, equity) capital instruments; (d) subordinated debt 
limited to 50 percent of Tier 1 capital and (e) asset revaluation reserves.  
 
From total capital (Tier 1 + Tier 2) banks deduct investments in unconsolidated 
subsidiaries and holdings of other banks’ capital (at national discretion) (BCBS, 1988). 
 
1.3.1.2 The Risk Weights 
BCBS considered that a weighted risk ratio in which capital is related to different 
categories of asset or off-balance-sheet exposure, weighted according to broad 
categories of relative riskiness, was the preferred method for assessing the capital 
adequacy of banks (BCBS, 1988). Risk-weighted assets are asset values multiplied by a 
factor (risk weight) that is a proxy of the credit risk related to these assets. The Basel I 
framework was kept as simple as possible and applied only five weights; 0, 10, 20, 50 
and 100 percent.  
 
1.3.1.3 A Target Capital Ratio 
The capital ratio expresses the relationship between the bank’s capital (tier 1 and tier 2 
capital) and its risk-weighted assets. To be adequately capitalized, it was agreed that an 
internationally active bank had to hold a target total capital ratio of minimum 8 percent 
of its risk-weighted assets, see equation 1. Additionally, the share of the core capital had 
to be at least 4 percent (BCBS, 1988), see equation 2. The capital requirement 
framework was designed to establish minimum levels of capital, and national authorities 
were free to adopt arrangements that set higher levels (BCBS, 1988). 
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Equation 1, Total Capital Ratio (BCBS, 1988) 
 
ܶ݋ݐ݈ܽܥܽ݌݅ݐ݈ܽܴܽݐ݅݋ ൌ
ܶ݅݁ݎͳ ൅ ܶ݅݁ݎʹ
ܴ݅ݏ݇ െܹ݄݁݅݃ݐ݁݀ܣݏݏ݁ݐݏ
൐ ͺǡͲΨ 
 
Equation 2, Total Capital Ratio (BCBS, 1988) 
 
 
ܥ݋ݎ݁ܥܽ݌݅ݐ݈ܽܴܽݐ݅݋ ൌ 
ܶ݅݁ݎͳܿܽ݌݅ݐ݈ܽ
ܴ݅ݏ݇ െ ݓ݄݁݅݃ݐ݁݀ܽݏݏ݁ݐݏ
൐ ͶǡͲΨ 
 
Basel I was directed towards assessing capital in relation to credit risk, the risk of 
counterparty failure. Other risks, notably interest rate risk and the investment risk on 
securities, needed to be taken into account by supervisors in assessing overall capital 
adequacy (BCBS, 1988). 
 
Basel I was enforced by law in the G10 countries in 1992. It has been criticized on 
several grounds, where the main critique was directed at its simplicity. The limited 
differentiation of credit risk, the lack of recognition of portfolio diversification effects, no 
recognition of term-structure of credit risk and simplified calculation of potential future 
counterparty risk, were some pitfalls in the Basel I Capital Accord. Basel II was 
developed in response to perceived shortcomings in Basel I, in particular with the asset 
risk-weighting system. 
 
1.3.2 Basel II  
Basel II, first published in June 2004, is the second of the capital accords recommended 
by BCBS. Basel II is based on three mutually reinforcing pillars: minimum capital 
requirements (Pillar I), the supervisory review process (Pillar II) and market discipline 
(Pillar III). The new framework was designed to improve the way regulatory capital 
requirements reflect underlying risks and to better address the financial innovation that 
has occurred in recent years. The changes aimed at rewarding and encouraging 
continued improvements in risk measurement and control (BCBS, 2005). 
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1.3.2.1 Pillar I 
Pillar I outlines the specific methodologies and approaches to determine minimum 
capital requirements based on credit risk, market risk and operational risk. The 
required level of the minimum capital ratios established in Basel I remain unchanged, 
but Pillar I in Basel II provides a fundamental update for the calculation of risk weighed 
assets, the denominator of the capital ratio.  
 
Calculation of risk-weighted assets 
With Basel II the banks have a choice between two broad methodologies for calculating 
their capital requirements for credit risk, namely the standardized approach and the 
internal ratings based approach (Andersen, 2013). 
 
The Standardized Approach 
The standardized approach increases the risk sensitivity of the capital framework by 
recognizing that different counterparties within the same loan category present far 
different risks to the financial institution. Thus, instead of placing all commercial loans 
in the 100 percent risk weight basket, the standardized approach takes into account the 
credit rating of the borrower. In determining the risk weights in the standardized 
approach, banks may use assessments by external credit assessment institutions 
recognized as eligible for capital purposes by national supervisors.  
 
The Internal Ratings Based Approach (IRB) 
Subject to certain minimum conditions and disclosure requirements, banks that have 
received supervisory approval to use the IRB approach may rely on their own internal 
estimates of risk components in determining the capital requirement for a given 
exposure (BCBS, 2005). The risk components include measures of the probability of 
default (PD), loss given default (LGD), the exposure at default (EAD), and effective 
maturity (M). In some cases, banks may be required to use a supervisory value as 
opposed to an internal estimate for one or more of the risk components. 
 
The IRB approach allows banks to be more flexible and use formulas developed by BCBS 
to calculate appropriate risk weights. Equation 3 is the formula for computing the risk-
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weight of residential mortgage exposures and serves as an example of the formulas used 
to calculate different risk-weights using the IRB approach. 
 
Equation 3 Risk-weight of residential mortgage exposures in Basel II (BCBS, 2005) 
 
ܴܹܣ ൌ ͳʹǡͷ כ ͳǡͲ͸ כ ܧܣܦሾܮܩܦ כ ܰ ቆ
ܩሺܲܦሻ ൅ ξܴ כ ܩሺͲǡͻͻͻሻ
ξͳ െ ܴ
ቇ െ ሺܲܦ כ ܮܦܩሻ 
 
where N is the cumulative standard normal distribution and G its inverse. The formula is 
calibrated to a solvency margin of 99.9 percent, which means that there is a probability 
of less than 0,1 percent that required capital does not cover the bank's losses over the 
next year. The formula contains a multiplier, which is set to 1.06 based on the 
quantitative impact analysis’ that BIS has conducted of Basel II. For the mass market, the 
correlation (R) is set to 0.15. It is only the correlation between each position and a factor 
for systemic risk that is taken into account. The correlation between the different 
positions is ignored. The formula thus assumes that all idiosyncratic risk can be 
diversified away (Andersen, 2013). 
 
When applying the IRB approach, banks can choose the foundation- or the advanced 
approach. Under the foundation approach, as a general rule, banks provide their own 
estimates of PD and rely on supervisory estimates for other risk components. Under the 
advanced approach, banks provide their own estimates of PD, LGD and EAD, and their 
own calculation of M, subject to meeting minimum standards. 
 
Market risk and operational risk 
In addition to the assessment of credit risk, Pillar I requires lenders to assess their 
market and operational risk and provide capital to cover such risk.  
 
Operational risk is defined as the risk of loss resulting from inadequate or failed internal 
processes, people and systems or from external events. This definition includes legal 
risk, but excludes strategic and reputational risk. There are three methods for 
calculating operational risk capital charges in a continuum of increasing sophistication 
and risk sensitivity: the basic indicator approach; the standardized approach; and 
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advanced measurement approaches. 
 
Market risk is defined as the risk of losses in on and off-balance-sheet positions arising 
from movements in market prices. The risks subject to this requirement are; the risks 
pertaining to interest rate related instruments and equities in the trading book, foreign 
exchange risk and commodities risk throughout the bank. There are two alternative 
approaches to the measurement of market risk, a standardized method and an internal 
models approach (BCBS, 2005). 
 
The amount of the total risk-weighted assets is determined by the sum of the risk-
weighted assets for credit risk, market risk and operational risk (BCBS, 2005). 
 
1.3.2.2 Pillar II 
Pillar II provides guidelines for supervisory review by national banking regulators. 
Banks assess their capital adequacy on the basis of their own internal risk management 
methodology and supervisors analyze whether a specific bank’s capital adequacy 
assessment is in line with its overall risk profile and business strategies (Dierick, Pires, 
Scheicher, & Spitzer, 2005). 
 
1.3.2.3 Pillar III 
Pillar III outlines the BIS perspective on market discipline, with particular emphasis on 
core disclosures that participating banks will be required to provide to the market as 
part of the reinforcement of safety and soundness within the banking industry (Dierick 
et al., 2005). 
 
Where Basel I only covered minimum capital requirements, the Basel II Framework 
rests on three complementary pillars and constitutes a further strengthening of the 
soundness and stability of the international banking system. However, despite the 
improvements relative to Basel I, the transition to Basel II led to a significant decrease in 
the risk weights of assets because of the introduction of the IRB approach. The decline in 
IRB banks’ risk weights has been especially large for residential mortgages and certain 
types of corporate loans. The intention behind the use of the IRB approach was to 
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improve alignment between capital requirements and banks’ risk management, by using 
more risk-sensitive weights that reflected the individual bank’s own assessment of risk. 
The initial assumption was that the introduction of the IRB approach would not result in 
a decline in the level of capital, however in several countries it did. 
 
To prevent banks' internal risk weights from reducing risk-weighted assets and thus 
banks' capital needs too much and too quickly, temporary, lower limits were set for how 
much capital could be reduced relative to Basel I. The arrangement is referred to as the 
"Basel I floor", or Basel II transitional rule. The lower limit was initially 95 percent of the 
value of risk-weighted assets calculated by Basel I. By year-end 2008 the limit was 
reduced to 80 percent (BCBS, 2005).  
 
1.3.3 Basel III 
As the financial markets and the financial services industry evolve, regulations and 
requirements become outdated.  The previous Basel Accords are widely perceived to 
have had various shortcomings that may have contributed to the financial crisis. 
However, even before Lehman Brothers collapsed in September 2008, the need for a 
fundamental strengthening of the Basel II framework had become apparent. 
BCBS believes that the previous frameworks neither adequately accounted for risks 
posed by exposures to transactions such as securitizations and derivatives nor required 
institutions to maintain adequate levels of capital. In response to these shortcomings, 
the third capital adequacy framework was published by BCBS in December 2010. The 
objective of the reform is to improve the banking sector’s ability to absorb shocks 
arising from financial and economic stress, whatever the source, thus reducing the risk 
of spillover from the financial sector to the real economy (BCBS, 2011) 
 
The regulatory framework is based upon the three pillars introduced in Basel II.  
 
1.3.3.1 Pillar I  
In Basel III the first pillar has been altered and encompasses three parts; capital, risk 
and leverage. 
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Capital 
Basel III introduces a new definition of capital to increase the quality, consistency and 
transparency of the capital base. The recent crisis demonstrated that banks were not 
keeping sufficient levels of capital, when credit losses and write-downs came out of 
retained earnings. The strengthening of the common equity of banks is an important 
part of the Basel III Capital Accord. Furthermore, the reform package removes the 
existing inconsistency in the definition of capital by harmonizing deductions of capital 
and by increasing transparency through disclosure requirements (BCBS, 2011). 
 
There are three categories; common equity tier 1, additional tier 1 and tier 2 capital. 
 
Common Equity Tier 1 
Common equity tier 1 (CET 1) consists of the sum of the following elements; (a) 
common shares issued by the bank that meet the criteria for classification as common 
shares for regulatory purposes (or the equivalent for non-joint stock companies); (b) 
stock surplus (share premium) resulting from the issue of instruments included in CET 
1; (c) retained earnings; (d) accumulated other comprehensive income and other 
disclosed reserves; (e) common shares issued by consolidated subsidiaries of the bank 
and held by third parties that meet the criteria for inclusion in CET 1 capital, see 
appendix 1 for the relevant criteria; and (f) regulatory adjustments applied in the 
calculation of CET 1 capital.  
 
Additional Tier 1 Capital 
Additional tier 1 capital consists of the sum of the following elements; (a) instruments 
issued by the bank that meet the criteria for inclusion in additional tier 1 capital (and 
are not included in CET 1); (b) stock surplus (share premium) resulting from the issue of 
instruments included in additional tier 1 capital; (c) instruments issued by consolidated 
subsidiaries of the bank and held by third parties that meet the criteria for inclusion in 
additional tier 1 capital and are not included in CET 1, see Appendix 1 for the relevant 
criteria; and (d) regulatory adjustments applied in the calculation of additional tier 1 
capital. 
 
Put simply, CET 1 capital is equity capital less goodwill and intangible assets. The 
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difference between additional tier 1 capital and common equity tier 1 capital comprises 
roughly speaking hybrid capital (FSAN, 2012). 
 
Tier 2 Capital 
Tier 2 capital consists of the sum of the following elements; (a) instruments issued by 
the bank that meet the criteria for inclusion in tier 2 capital (and are not included in tier 
1 capital); (b) stock surplus (share premium) resulting from the issue of instruments 
included in tier 2 capital; (c) instruments issued by consolidated subsidiaries of the bank 
and held by third parties that meet certain criteria for inclusion in tier 2 capital and are 
not included in tier 1 capital; (d) certain loan loss provisions and (e) regulatory 
adjustments applied in the calculation of tier 2 Capital.  
 
Limits and Minima 
According to the BCBS, the global banking system entered the crisis with an insufficient 
level of high quality capital. The minimum required CET 1 ratio is raised to 4,5 percent 
of risk-weighted assets, after deductions, see equation 4. Total tier 1 capital (common 
equity plus additional tier 1 capital) must be minimum 6,0 percent of risk-weighted 
assets at all times, see equation 5. Total capital (tier 1 plus tier 2 capital) must be at least 
8,0 percent of risk-weighted assets at all times, see equation 6. 
 
Equation 4, CET 1 Ratio (BCBS, 2011) 
 
ܥܧܶͳܴܽݐ݅݋ ൌ 
ܥ݋݉݉݋݊ܧݍݑ݅ݐݕܶ݅݁ݎͳ
ܴ݅ݏ݇ െܹ݄݁݅݃ݐ݁݀ܣݏݏ݁ݐݏ
൐ ͶǡͷΨ 
 
 
Equation 5, Tier 1 Capital Ratio (BCBS, 2011) 
 
ܶ݅݁ݎͳܥܽ݌݅ݐ݈ܽܴܽݐ݅݋ ൌ 
ܥ݋݉݉݋݊ܧݍݑ݅ݐݕܶ݅݁ݎͳ ൅ ܣ݀݀݅ݐ݋݈݊ܽܶ݅݁ݎͳܥܽ݌݅ݐ݈ܽ
ܴ݅ݏ݇ െܹ݄݁݅݃ݐ݁݀ܣݏݏ݁ݐݏ
൐ ͸ǡͲΨ 
 
 
 
Equation 6, Total Capital Ratio (BCBS, 2011) 
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ܴ݅ݏ݇ െܹ݄݁݅݃ݐ݁݀ܣݏݏ݁ݐݏ
൐ ͺǡͲΨ 
 
Equity Buffers 
A key element in the new framework is capital buffers that come on top of the minimum 
common equity requirement and increases banks' loss-absorbing capacity. The capital 
conservation buffer equals common equity of 2,5 percent of risk-weighted assets, 
bringing the total common equity standard to 7 percent.  
 
The countercyclical capital buffer will come on top as a capital requirement that can be 
increased in good times and removed in bad times. The countercyclical buffer is to 
consist of CET 1 capital and can normally be set between 0 and 2,5 percent of a bank's 
risk-weighted assets. 
 
In addition to meeting the Basel III requirements, global systemically important 
financial institutions (SIFIs) must have higher loss absorbency capacity to reflect  the 
greater risks that they pose to the financial system. Systemically important banks are 
often so big and interconnected with the financial markets that problems in the bank 
have spillover effects that are of significant harm to society. The additional loss 
absorbency requirements are to be met with a progressive CET 1 capital requirement 
ranging from 1 percent to 2,5 percent, depending on a bank’s systemic importance. For 
banks facing the highest surcharge, an additional loss absorbency of 1 percent could be 
applied as a disincentive to increase materially their global systemic importance in the 
future (BCBS, 2011).  
 
When buffers have been drawn down, one way banks should look to rebuild them is 
through reducing discretionary distributions of earnings. This could include reducing 
dividend payments, share-backs and staff bonus payments. Banks may also choose to 
raise new capital from the private sector as an alternative to conserving internally 
generated capital (BCBS, 2011). In the event that a bank has lower than required equity 
buffers the framework reduces the discretion of banks to further reduce them through 
generous distributions of earnings. 
 
 23 
Risk 
During the 2008 crisis, BCBS learned that the risk-weights on certain asset classes, for 
example those on residential mortgage backed securities7, did not reflect reality, leaving 
banks over-leveraged in the context of the crisis (BCBS, 2011). Basel III strengthens the 
capital treatment for certain complex securitizations and requires banks to conduct 
more rigorous credit analyses of externally rated securitization exposures. There is also 
a substantial strengthening of the counterparty credit risk framework.  
 
Leverage 
A non-risk-based leverage ratio is introduced that includes off-balance sheet exposures 
and will serve as a backstop to the risk-based capital requirement while contributing to 
containing system wide build-up of leverage.  
 
1.3.3.2 Pillar II 
Supplemental Pillar II requirements address firm-wide governance and risk 
management; capturing the risk of off-balance sheet exposures and securitization 
activities; managing risk concentrations and providing incentives for banks to better 
manage risk and returns in the long term (BCBS, 2011). 
 
1.3.3.3 Pillar III 
The reformed requirements under Pillar III relate to securitization exposures and 
sponsorship of off-balance sheet vehicles. Enhanced disclosures on the detail of the 
components of regulatory capital and their reconciliation to the reported accounts is 
required, including a comprehensive explanation of how a bank calculates it’s regulatory 
capital ratios (BCBS, 2011). 
 
1.3.3.4 Liquidity Requirements 
In addition to the three pillars presented above, Basel III introduced liquidity 
requirements with the aim of ensuring that banks have an adequate stock of high quality 
                                                        
7 A Mortgage-Backed Security (MBS) is a type of asset-backed security that uses a single mortgage, or a 
pool of them, as collateral. Investors receive payments derived from the interest and principal of the 
underlying mortgages. 
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liquid assets. While capital requirements protect banks against a sudden drop in the 
value of their assets, liquidity requirements protect banks against bank runs.  
 
1.3.4 Implementation in EU and Norway  
The Basel Capital Accords must be translated into national law and regulation in order 
to become valid in each country. In the European Union (EU) the Basel rules are 
translated into EU Capital Requirements Directives (CRD), which are binding 
instructions upon EU Member States to prepare and implement compliant national 
legislation (Shearman & Sterling, 2013). These directives are also binding for nations 
that are a part of the European Economic Area (EEA). The EEA unites the EU Member 
States, and Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway, into an internal market governed by the 
same basic rules (EFTA, 2013). 
 
1.3.4.1 The European Capital Requirement Directives 
The previous European directives that covered Basel I and II were repealed by January 
1st 2014, when the CRD IV came into effect. The CRD IV was signed into law on July 1st, 
2013 and covers the EU’s implementation of Basel III. The directive contains proposals 
addressing prudential supervision and the new capital conservation and countercyclical 
capital buffer.  
 
The regulatory package also addresses certain areas not covered by Basel III, which the 
EU nevertheless wishes to implement. One example of a key regulation introduced by 
the EU that does not have an equivalent rule in Basel III is the systemic risk buffer. The 
aim is to prevent and mitigate long-term non-cyclical systemic or macro prudential risks, 
where disruption in the financial system could potentially have serious consequences on 
the real economy. The buffer is to consist of CET 1 capital and member states will be 
able to apply systemic risk buffers of 1 percent to 3 percent for all exposures, and up to 
5 percent for domestic and third country exposures (The Council of the European Union, 
2013).  
 
Furthermore, the CRD IV extends the Basel I floor of 80 percent until 2017 
(Borchgrevink, 2012).  
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1.3.4.2 Banking Regulation in Norway 
As part of the EEA, Norway must implement all the rules covered in the CRD IV. The 
Ministry of Finance has the overall responsibility for ensuring financial stability in 
Norway, while the Norwegian Central Bank (Norges Bank) has an advisory role in this 
process. The Financial Supervisory Authority of Norway (FSAN), which is a government 
agency subject to the Ministry of Finance, is responsible for overseeing the financial 
institutions in the country with the aim of promoting safety and soundness in the 
Norwegian financial sector. The FSAN manages the work of translating EU directives and 
legislation affecting Norwegian financial institutions, into Norwegian regulation (FSAN, 
2014). 
 
The financial crisis did not reveal significant inadequacies in the financial market 
regulation in Norway. The Basel II framework was implemented in January 2007 and in 
certain key areas, the Norwegian regulation was somewhat stricter than in many other 
countries and stricter than what have been the minimum requirements in the EU. This 
contributed to better-capitalized Norwegian financial institutions at the outbreak of the 
crisis. In addition, financial regulation in Norway was designed to encompass all 
relevant financial sector entities, strongly limiting the possibility to exploit regulatory 
differences. 
 
 Even though a strong regulatory framework was in place, Norway is a small, open 
economy that is susceptible to international market turbulence. The international 
financial crisis did affect Norwegian banks by restricting their access to capital (FSAN, 
2009). The Norwegian financial markets were hit by increasingly higher risk premiums 
in the bond and money markets. Although government measures to improve banks’ 
financing amended the situation, banks found it difficult to obtain long-term market 
funding. Furthermore, Norwegian banks are heavily exposed to commercial property, 
which saw a sharp drop in value in 2008.  
 
Basel III and CRD IV 
The Ministry of Finance wanted to strengthen the Norwegian regulatory framework, and 
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the relatively strong position of Norwegian banks made it possible to introduce Basel III 
requirements earlier in Norway than most other European countries. The Ministry of 
Finance required all Norwegian credit institutions to keep a CET 1 capital ratio of 
minimum 9 percent from 30 June 2012, while the final rules were being drafted. On 22nd 
of March 2013, the Ministry of Finance proposed changes to the Norwegian regulatory 
framework, which were approved and came into effect on July 1st, 2013 (FSAN (1), 
2013).  The new capital requirements are gradually being introduced in the period from 
July 1st 2013 until July 1st 2016.  
 
The regulation concerning equity buffers gives authorities leeway to adjust the size of 
the buffers based on country-specific factors. The capital conservation buffer is required 
to be 2.5 percent, but the countercyclical buffer requirement can be set up to 2.5 percent.  
 
Norwegian credit and asset prices have risen over a number of years, and total debt has 
reached a high level. House prices and debt continue to rise more rapidly than income. 
Around one tenth of households hold debt equivalent to five times their income and may 
face problems servicing their debt if interest rates rise or incomes fall. This will affect 
consumption, which will have ripple effects on the wider economy and banks may face 
higher losses on corporate lending as a result. The countercyclical capital buffer is 
intended to counteract the procyclical effects of bank lending and will help contain the 
degree of deleveraging in bad times (Olsen, 2013). On December 11th 2013 the Minister 
of Finance, Siv Jensen, announced that banks are required to hold a countercyclical 
buffer of 1 percent by July 1st, 2015 (Ministry of Finance, 2013).  
 
There is an additional buffer requirement for systemically important institutions. On 
May 12th 2014, the Ministry of Finance announced that the strictest buffer for 
systemically important banks set by the EU in CRD IV, of 2 percent should be 
implemented (Ministry of Finance, 2014). The regulation stipulates that the Ministry of 
Finance as a general rule will designate financial institutions with total assets 
corresponding to at least 10 percent of Mainland Norway’s GDP, or a share of the 
Norwegian lending market of at least 5 percent, as systemically important. DNB, Nordea 
and Kommunalbanken were identified as systemically important in Norway. These 
banks will therefore be subject to the additional buffer of 1 percent CET 1 capital from 
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July 1st 2015 and 2 percent CET 1 capital by July 1st 2016 (Ministry of Finance, 2014). 
 
In addition to the capital requirements set out in the Basel III Capital Accord, the 
systemic risk buffer introduced by the Council of the European Union was adopted in 
Norway through the EEA and amount to 3 percent additional CET 1 capital. 
 
Chart 1 shows the capital requirements in Basel II and in Basel III when they are fully 
implemented in Norway July 1st, 2016. There is an especially large increase in the CET 1 
capital that banks are required to hold. In addition to the CET 1 capital, there is the 
requirement of 1.5 percent additional tier 1 capital and 2.0 percent tier 2 capital, making 
the total capital requirement 16.5 percent for systemically important banks in 2016.  
 
 
 
Chart 1 Capital requirements in Basel II compared to the new regulatory framework 1 July 2016 (Norges Bank, 
2013 & BCBS, 2005)  
 
Chart 2 below shows the implementation plan for CET 1 capital in Norway.  By 1 July 
2016 the total requirement of CET 1 is scheduled to be 13 percent for systemically 
important banks. 
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Chart 2 Common Equity Tier 1 capital ratio requirements in the new regulatory framework. 1 July 2013 – 1 
July 2016 (Norges Bank (1), 2013) 
 
Higher capital requirements will compel a number of Norwegian banks to strengthen 
their core capital position in the period ahead. The FSAN’s position is that banks must 
maintain an adequate margin to the regulatory requirements. The Ministry of Finance 
may impose requirements over and above those in effect for individual institutions or 
groups of institutions. 
 
Amendments to the CRD IV regarding mortgage assets 
On 13 October 2013 the Norwegian Ministry of Finance amended the rules governing 
risk-weighted assets for capital requirements for banks that use IRB models. To support 
financial stability the minimum requirement on LGD on mortgage assets was raised 
from 10 to 20 per cent. The Ministry of Finance claims that an LGD floor of 20 percent 
will give risk weights on mortgage assets of 20 percent or more in the IRB-models. This 
represents a substantial increase compared to current and previous levels. Risk-weights 
per 31 December 2011 are displayed in Chart 3. 
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Chart 3 Average risk-weights for mortgage (purple columns) and corporate (orange columns) loans in 
Norwegian IRB-banks. Percent. Per 31 December 2011 (Syvertsen, 2012)  
 
The new rule came into effect in January 2014. Under CRD IV, yet to be incorporated in 
the EEA agreement, this requirement also applies to foreign banks' branches (FSAN (1), 
2013). 
 
In addition to raising the minimum requirement on LGD, the FSAN is now considering 
changing the PD calibration and introducing a minimum PD in the IRB models for 
Norwegian mortgage assets. In a letter dated 21 February 2014 to Finance Norway 
(FNO), the FSAN suggest introducing a new PD calibration where the PD value is 
calculated by a weighted average of the average PD level during crisis and the average 
PD during a normal business cycle.  The FSAN proposes a PD value of 4 percent to reflect 
the crisis estimate, weighted by 20 percent and a PD value representing the normal 
business cycle estimated by each bank, weighted 80 percent (FSAN, 2014). Additionally, 
a minimum exposure level PD in the region 0.2 – 0.3 percent is suggested.  
 
The current average risk weight for mortgage exposures is 10.0 per cent. Taking into 
accounta 20% LGD floor and the amendments made to the PD regulation, the estimated 
new average level of the PD is 22.8 percent. The final rules are expected to be 
announced during 2014.  
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As presented, the international rules and regulations of the Basel accords are 
interpreted and applied differently in different regions and countries. The actual effect 
that capital requirements have on banks’ behavior and decision-making is also 
depended on the market in which they operate. In the second part of the thesis, the 
Norwegian banking sector is presented, with emphasis on key characteristics that are 
relevant for the case study in part 3. The capital adequacy of Norway’s five largest banks 
is also briefly studied in the following part 2.  
 
2 The Norwegian Banking Sector 
 
2.1 Market structure 
Compared to other European countries, the banking sector in Norway is small relative to 
total GDP. The total assets of the Norwegian banking sector are approximately two times 
GDP. By comparison, the assets of the Swedish banking sector are four times GDP 
(Norges Bank (3), 2013).  If the relative size of the banking sector is viewed as an 
indicator of systemic risk, then the systemic risk in the Norwegian banking sector might 
be relatively low. 
 
The Norwegian banking sector is characterized by a relatively high level of 
concentration and consists of a few large bank groups and numerous small banks. Chart 
4 shows the ten largest financial institutions measured by market share of gross loans to 
customers in 2013 (Finance Norway, 2013). DNB is by far the largest provider of loans 
in Norway, with a market share of 30.3 percent of gross loans to customers in 2013.  
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Chart 4, Gross lending in Norway as of December 31, group figures, the ten largest banks (Finance Norway, 
2013) 
 
There are two types of banks in Norway; savings banks and commercial banks (Ministry 
of Finance, 2012). Norwegian savings and commercial banks hold the exclusive right to 
accept deposits from the public, and deposit and lending activities constitute the core of 
the banks’ activities. The difference between the two types of banks lies in their own 
capital instruments (Ministry of Finance, 2012). 
 
Commercial banks are organized as limited companies and obtain their capital by 
issuing shares. There are 16 commercial banks in Norway as of 31 December 2012 
(Finance Norway, 2013). 
 
Norwegian savings banks have traditionally been organized as independent foundations 
whose equity essentially consisted of ownerless capital build-up of retained profits. In 
1987 the Savings Banks Act was amended to enable savings banks to bring in capital 
from the market, by issuing primary capital certificates, from 1 July 2009 termed “Equity 
Certificates” (ECs)8 (The Norwegian Savings Banks Association, 2013). There are 
currently 109 savings banks in Norway. Out of these, 32 banks have issued ECs.  
                                                        
8 New term - new body of rules: Act of 19 June 2009 No. 46 on changes in the Financial Institutions Act and certain other statutes 
(relating to forms of capital and organization in the savings bank sector etc) came into force on 1 July 2009. On the same date, new 
regulations on equity certificates came into effect while the old regulations on primary capital certificates were revoked (The 
Norwegian Savings Banks Association, 2013). 
No. Top 10 banks NOKm Market share
1 DNB Bank-konsernet 1,050,093                                      30.27 %
2 Nordea Bank Norge 463,854                                         13.37 %
3 Handelsbanken 182,800                                         5.27 %
4 Danske Bank 170,900                                         4.93 %
5 SpareBank 1 SR-Bank 158,383                                         4.56 %
6 Mortgage loans by the Norwegian State 141,416                                         4.08 %
7 Sparebanken Vest 112,937                                         3.26 %
8 SpareBank 1 SMN 111,875                                         3.22 %
9 SpareBank 1 Nord-Norge 79,442                                            2.29 %
10 Sparebanken Hedmark 47,800                                            1.38 %
Others 950,019                                         27.38 %
Total gross lending 3,469,519                                      100.00 %
2013
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The savings banks have also been given the opportunity to convert to private limited 
companies, still being savings banks as long as at least 10 percent of the shares are 
controlled by a savings bank foundation. Currently, three savings banks have converted 
to private limited companies, including DNB. 
 
Several of the large Scandinavian financial groups are active in the Norwegian market. 
Nordea’s Norwegian subsidiary bank is Norway’s second largest bank. Also branches of 
foreign banks are active and their loans, primarily Handelsbanken and Danske Bank, 
account for around 11% of total lending (Norges Bank (3), 2013). 
 
Specialized mortgage credit institutions provide loans in addition to banks. These 
companies raise loans by issuing covered bonds9. The Norwegian covered bond 
legislation was adopted in June 2007, and had just come into effect when the financial 
crisis hit the international financial markets. I order to provide liquidity to the 
Norwegian banking market, the authorities opted to swap treasury bills for covered 
bonds with Norwegian banks and mortgage companies. As treasury bills are considered 
the safest and most liquid source of funding, this arrangement greatly increased the 
liquidity of Norwegian credit institutions. However, neither commercial banks nor 
savings banks are allowed to issue covered bonds. In order to take advantage of the 
authorities’ liquidity window, a large number of banks established mortgage credit 
institutions as new subsidiaries. Today more than 20 Norwegian specialized credit 
institutions are licensed to issue covered bonds (Finance Norway, 2013).  
 
2.2 Interest rates 
2.2.1 The Key Policy Rate 
The key policy rate is the interest rate that banks earn on their overnight deposits in 
Norges Bank. It is the short-term interest rate benchmark that anchors the broader 
interest rate structure for the domestic financial system. By changing the key policy rate, 
the central bank affects the short money market rates, thus affecting the money market 
                                                        
9 Obligasjoner med fortrinnsrett – OMF – are equal to covered bonds issued by other European countries and the regulation is 
adapted to match the directives of the EEA-agreement 
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rates with longer maturity. These in turn affect the rates on government bonds, private 
bonds and banks’ lending rates.   
 
Banks normally hold deposits of a certain volume in the central bank they can draw on 
to cover unanticipated payments before they have to borrow from other banks in the 
market. When these deposits are sufficiently large, short-term money market rates will 
be pushed down towards the deposit rate. The level of reserves required to achieve this 
depends on bank demand and can vary over time.  
 
On 3 October 2011 a new system was introduced where only a certain portion of a 
bank’s deposits in the central bank (a quota) bears interest at the key policy rate. 
Deposits in excess of the quota bears interest at a lower rate, the reserve rate. The 
quotas are determined by Norges Bank. 
 
Decisions concerning the key policy rate are normally taken at the Norwegian Central 
Bank Executive Board’s monetary policy meeting, which is arranged six times per year 
(Norges Bank (2), 2013). The key policy rate is set with a view to maintaining inflation 
of close to 2.5 percent over time without causing excessive fluctuations in output and 
employment. As Norway is a small, open economy, we are highly influenced by the 
international interest level, as evidenced by the correlation between foreign money 
market rates and Norwegian money market rates in Chart 5. 
 
At the Board Meeting on March 26th 2014, the key policy rate was maintained at the low 
level of 1.5 percent. The analyses in the first monetary policy report of 2014 implies that 
the key policy rate should be held at the current level in the period until the summer of 
2015 and be increased gradually thereafter, see Chart 5.  
 
2.2.2 The Norwegian Inter Bank Offered Rate 
The Norwegian money market rate, Nibor (Norwegian Inter Bank Offered Rate), reflects 
the interest rate that banks in the Nibor panel on average indicate that they require for 
unsecured lending of Norwegian kroner to other leading banks that are active in the 
Norwegian money and foreign exchange market for a given period. The panel is made up 
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of DNB, Danske Bank, Svenska Handelsbanken, Nordea Bank Norge, SEB and Swedbank 
(Kårvik & Hellum, 2012). 
 
Nibor equals the key policy rate plus a spread, which is referred to as the money market 
premium and expresses the additional return money market participants require for 
unsecured interbank loans in relation to the risk-free interest rate in a given period. It 
represents compensation to the lender for credit risk and the benefit foregone from 
relinquishing liquidity. The money market premium widens during market turbulence 
(Hoff, 2011). Prior to the financial crisis money market premiums were low and stable 
both in Norway and other countries, but in the autumn of 2008 they soared. At the end 
of 2013, the premium in the three-month Nibor has fallen to about 0.20 percentage 
points, which is somewhat lower than the pre-crisis level. This could indicate that 
confidence in the Norwegian money markets is being restored. The first monetary policy 
report of 2014 maintains that the premium in money market rates is expected to remain 
around 1⁄4 percentage point ahead. Bank lending rates are expected to track 
developments in money market rates in the short term, but Norges Bank estimates that 
it may rise somewhat less, further out in the projection period, see Chart 5. 
 
 
 
Chart 5 Projected key policy rate, 3-month money market rate1) and interest rate on loans to households2) 
and foreign money market rates in the baseline scenario. Percent. 2008 Q1 – 2017 Q4. (Norges Bank (4), 
2014) 
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1) Key policy rate in the baseline scenario plus premiums in the Norwegian money market. The calculations 
are based on the assumption that the announced interest rate changes are priced into the money markets. 
2) Average interest rate on all loans to households from banks and mortgage companies.  
 
2.3 Funding 
When we talk about funding for nonfinancial firms, we talk about debt and equity; a firm 
raises funds from both equity investors and bondholders (and banks) to fund its 
investments. The same thinking can be applied to banks, however, when we talk about 
funding for banks, debt and equity also have a somewhat different connotation. Rather 
than viewing debt and equity as sources of capital, they can be viewed as raw materials; 
in the same way that a manufacturing firm needs raw materials for production, debt and 
equity is the input when the bank “produces” loans to its customers. The composition of 
the bank’s liabilities determines the cost of input, and is therefore a key determinant of a 
bank’s profitability.  
 
The bank’s sources of funding and funding cost are further explained in the sections 
below. 
 
2.3.1 Sources of Funding 
The bank’s key sources of funding are deposits from the public and various types of 
wholesale funding. Chart 6 shows the average balance sheet of Norwegian banks and 
mortgage companies in 2011, third quarter. 
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Chart 6, Bank1) assets and liabilities. Percent. 2011 Q3 (Hoff, 2011) 
1) All banks and mortgage companies in Norway 
 
Customer deposits have been a stable funding source, also in periods of financial turmoil, 
partly due to the deposit guarantee scheme. The guarantee given by the Banks' 
Guarantee Fund covers up to NOK 2 million per depositor per bank, and at the end of 
2012 guaranteed deposits accounted for 55 percent of total deposits from customers in 
Norwegian banks (FSAN (1), 2013). 
 
Wholesale funding is the marginal funding source for loans to households and 
businesses. Banks may need to raise a large amount of funding over a short period. This 
cannot be done through raising retail deposits by increasing the deposit rates, because 
bank customers (households and firms) typically do not react quickly to changes in 
interest rates (Raknerud, Vatne, & Rakkestad, 2011). 
 
Wholesale funding refers to deposits from financial institutions and securities debt. The 
largest Norwegian banks rely heavily on foreign markets for both long- and short-term 
wholesale funding. Certificates and interbank market loans represent the sources of 
wholesale funding with the shortest maturity. Long-term funding is obtained in the bond 
market, where the maturity is usually from 3 to 10 years (Hoff, 2011). Long-term 
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wholesale funding comprises covered bonds and senior bonds.  
 
Banks' wholesale funding has risen markedly since banks were permitted to issue 
covered bonds through mortgage companies in 2007. Wholesale funding accounted for 
45 percent of total funding at the end of 2012, compared to 35 percent in 2004. During 
2008 and 2009 a total NOK 230 billion of Norwegian covered bonds was lodged in swap 
agreements with the Government. These bonds could be refinanced in the market at 
term, or earlier at the choice of the issuer. As of June 2013 about NOK 94 billion was still 
outstanding and due for refinanced during 2013 and 2014 (Hoff, 2011). 
 
In 2013, the wholesale funding ratios declined somewhat between Q1 and Q2, see Chart 
7 (Norges Bank (1), 2013). During periods of strong lending growth, growth in 
wholesale funding has outpaced deposit growth. However, solid deposit growth 
combined with moderate growth in lending is currently limiting the need to increase 
market funding, see Chart 8 (Norges Bank (1), 2013).  
 
 
 
Chart 7, Banks’1) wholesale funding as a percentage of total assets2) (Norges Bank (2), 2013) 
1) All banks and covered bond mortgage companies excluding branches and subsidiaries of foreign banks 
2) Quarterly figures pre-1989 are calculated by linear interpolation of annual figures 
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Chart 8, Banks’1) wholesale funding, deposits and loans. Four-quarter growth. Percent. Q1 1995 - Q2 2013 
(Norges Bank (1), 2013) 
1) All banks and covered bond mortgage companies excluding branches and subsidiaries of foreign banks in 
Norway 
 
Banks can also free up funds by accessing deposits with central banks and other banks, 
or sell assets. Deposits with central banks and other financial institutions are normally 
short term and can be released quickly. Norwegian banks have deposited a substantial 
portion of its securities in Norges Bank to gain access to loans on short notice. The loan 
amount is determined based on the securities' market value. Additionally, Norges Bank 
offer standing lending facilities, from which banks are able to receive funding. This is 
however considered expensive and is rarely used in normal times (Hoff, 2011). 
 
For nonfinancial firms, equity is often a significant part of the firm’s capital structure. 
For banks however, the equity to debt ratio has historically been very low and the bank 
is mainly funded by debt, illustrated by Chart 6 above. This can be explained in part by 
the more predictable earnings, fairly stable grounds for income (with a growing 
economy, there will always be a demand for credit) and the supervision of banks which 
reduces the risk for bankruptcy (as opposed to nonfinancial firms, banks are monitored 
by an independent party).  
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2.3.2 Cost of Funding 
A bank’s total cost of funding is a function of the composition of liabilities and the costs 
of raising the different liabilities. By cost I refer to the interest expense that the bank 
pays on its debt and the dividends paid to equity owners, the shareholders, for their 
ownership stake in the business.  
 
The right side column in Chart 6 above indicates the relative average expense of 
different sources of funding for banks in the third quarter of 2011. Gebnerally customer 
deposits and deposits and loans from financial enterprises are the cheapest form of 
funding, followed by other liabilities including certificates and bonds. Subordinated debt 
capital, which qualifies as additional tier 1 capital and tier 2 capital is more expensive 
than other debt instruments. Finally, there is equity, which is the most expensive source 
of funding for banks.  
 
Debt is cheaper than equity for two reasons. First, because creditors have a prior claim 
in the event of bankruptcy and can require covenants, debt is safer than equity and 
therefore warrants investors a lower return. For the bank this translates into an interest 
rate that is lower than the expected total shareholder return on equity. Second, the 
interest that the bank pays on its debt is tax deductible, while dividends are not.  
 
The key policy rate is the primary determinant of a bank’s funding cost. The 3-month 
Nibor can be viewed as the key policy rate plus the market risk premium and the rate on 
5-year senior bank bonds can be viewed as a risk premium to the 3-month Nibor. This 
could be illustrated through Chart 9, which shows the key policy rate and funding costs 
from 2010 until the first quarter of 2013. 
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Chart 9, Lending rate on corporate loans1) and funding costs2) (Vikrøen, 2013) 
1) All banks and mortgage companies in Norway 
2) Estimated using weighted interest rate on senior bank bonds outstanding and weighted deposit rate 
 
Covered bonds and senior bonds may have fixed or floating interest rates. For fixed-rate 
loans, mortgage companies and banks will enter into interest rate swap contracts to 
exchange fixed-rate for floating-rate loans. Ordinarily, the floating rate is the Nibor. The 
fixed-rate loans are used to fund floating rate loans. The interest rate on a bond can thus 
be divided in two: the money market rate (Nibor in Norway) and a fixed risk premium. 
The risk premium banks must pay is determined by both general market conditions and 
the market’s assessment of a particular bank as a borrower (Hoff, 2011). 
 
After having risen since 2008, average risk premiums on bank bonds outstanding have 
leveled off, see Chart 10. This indicates that investors consider there to be less risk 
associated with investments in Norwegian banks now relative to a few years back.  As 
Norway is a small open economy, we are heavily influenced by the international market 
conditions. During the financial crisis in 2008-2009 and the debt crisis in Europe in 
2011-2012, the risk premiums increased even though the Norwegian economy was 
relatively stable and Norwegian banks performed well. Now that the worst of the crisis 
is over, and investors less anxious about investing in banks, risk premiums are coming 
down.   
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Chart 10, Average risk premium1) on new and outstanding bond debt for Norwegian banking groups2). Basis 
points. January 2008-Februry 2014 (Norges Bank (4), 2014) 
1) Difference against 3-month NIBOR 
2) All banks and mortgage companies, excluding branches of foreign banks in Norway 
 
Another possible explanation to the lower risk-premiums could be the build-up of 
capital in Norwegian banks. Goldberg, Kennedy and Miu (2010) linked bank balance 
sheet strength to the cost of funds during the global financial crisis. They found that 
stronger banks borrowed Euros during the crisis at lower average costs than medium- 
or lower-rated banks. The current build-up of capital in banks may reduce bondholders’ 
risk exposure, which suggests lower risk premiums (Norges Bank (1), 2013). 
 
Nevertheless, if premiums on new funding remain at the current level, the average 
premium on bank bonds outstanding will decline somewhat in the period ahead. 
 
Banks also swap long-term fixed-rate foreign currency funding to floating-rate krone 
funding. This means that banks’ borrowing costs for short- and long-term funding both 
in foreign currency and in Norwegian kroner is affected by changes in the Nibor.  
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Deposits 
Household deposits are considered to be a very stable source of funding. Increased focus 
on banks’ funding structure and the forthcoming Basel liquidity requirements may have 
boosted competition among banks for household deposits, which can explain the decline 
in deposit rates displayed in Chart 11. The average deposit rate increased somewhat in 
the fourth quarter of 2013. 
 
 
 
Chart 11, Deposit rate1) and money market rate. Percent. 1 Jan ´10 – 12 Nov ´13 (Norges Bank (2), 2013) 
1) All banks in Norway 
 
2.4 Earnings 
A bank makes money on the spread between the interest it pays to those from whom it 
raises funds and the interest it charges those who borrow from it, and from other 
services it offers depositors and its lenders. The primary driver for a bank’s earnings is 
the net interest margin, which is the difference between the interest that a lender 
receives on all loans and the interest it pays on all funding of those loans divided by total 
loans (Raknerud, Vatne, & Rakkestad, 2011). Loan losses and the cost of operations are 
also important drivers for a bank’s earnings. Additionally, stricter regulatory 
requirements have an effect on earnings, through reduced margins.   
 
Norwegian banks have shown sound profits for the last couple of years. CEO of 
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Sparebank1 SMN, Finn Haugan, believes that Norwegian banks is experiencing a golden 
age. In an interview with Dagens Næringsliv10 (1 November, 2013), he stated that all-
time high interest margins and all-time low loan losses are the main contributory factors 
to the high earnings. The increased interest margin on residential mortgage loans is 
illustrated in Chart 12 (Norges Bank (2), 2013).  
 
 
 
 
Chart 12, Mortgage lending rates1) and funding costs. Percent. 1 Jan ´10 – 20 Mar ´14 (Norges Bank (4), 2014) 
1) All banks in Norway 
 
The estimated cost of mortgage financing has decreased and the rates on mortgage loans 
have increased, causing a significant increase in the interest margin of mortgage loans. 
Even though the deposit rate has increased somewhat in the second half of 2013, 
reducing banks’ earnings, loans to households are substantially larger than deposits 
from households and earnings have increased. 
 
Loan losses are of great significance for banks' results as . There was an increase in loan 
losses after the international financial crisis of 2008, but the increase was temporary. 
From an already low initial level, banks' loan losses were further reduced in 2012. Loan 
                                                        
10 The Norwegian Business Daily 
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defaults also fell, and measured 1.5 percent of outstanding loans in 2012. In the end of 
2013 losses was somewhat higher than the previous year, but are still at a low level 
(FSAN (1), 2013). Low loan losses boosts earnings. 
 
Banks have reduced their costs substantially in order to maintain satisfactory profits. 
The average cost/income ratio was reduced by 3 percent in 2012, to 53 per cent. Banks 
have continued their drive to improve cost efficiency in 2013 (FSAN (1), 2013). This has 
contributed to the increased earnings.  
 
The increased interest on rate mortgage loans and the reduction of operational costs are 
efforts made by banks mainly to adapt to the higher capital requirements that have been 
introduced and will continue to be gradually introduced until July 1st 2016. In the 
following I will address the capital adequacy of Norwegian banks.  
 
2.5 Capital Adequacy 
Norwegian banks have focused on improving their capital adequacy since 2008, when 
the FSAN asked several banks to raise their capital adequacy targets and some of the 
larger banks to start building capital (Steffensen, 2009).  Also international regulatory 
bodies highlighted the need for increased capital requirements before any formal 
requirements were approved; In a press release on March 12th 2009, the Basel 
Committee wrote that ”.......the regulatory minimum level of capital will be reviewed in 
2010, taking into account relevant factors to arrive at a total level and quality of capital 
that is higher than the current Basel II framework”. Partly due to market expectations 
and partly due to the communicated increase in capital requirements both on a national 
and international level, Norwegian banks improved their solidity in 2009 (FSAN, 2010). 
With the continued strengthening of the regulatory framework since then, banks’ have 
maintained a focus on solidification. 
 
Chart 13 shows the development in CET 1 capital from 2011 to 2013 for the five largest 
Norwegian banks, excluding bank branches and subsidiaries of foreign banks. The 
dotted line represents the expected CET 1 ratio requirement for Norwegian systemically 
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important banks as of 1 July 2016, and the other line represents the requirement as of 1 
July 2013. 
 
 
 
Chart 13 CET 1 Ratio for the five largest Norwegian banks. Percent. Year-end 2013 (Annual and quarterly 
reports)  
 
Only one of Norway’s five largest banks is considered systemically important, however 
the Ministry of Finance has indicated that somewhat stricter requirements could also be 
applied to the large regional banks as they are important in their region, if not on a 
country-wide basis. 
 
The large Norwegian banks meet the core capital requirements of 9 percent CET 1 
capital to risk-weighted assets. Both the DNB Bank Group and Sparebank 1 SMN have 
had sufficient levels of CET 1 capital since 2011. From the chart it is shown that banks 
have been building common equity in recent years, and are therefore significantly better 
capitalized in 2013 compared to 2011. Sparebank 1 Nord-Norge issued equity capital 
certificates in Q3 2013. Norne Securities (2013) estimated that NONG through issuing 
capital improved the bank’s CET 1 ratio by 1.3 percent. As of the end of 2013, NONG is 
the best capitalized bank by the CET 1 ratio.   
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Chart 14 shows the total capital ratio for the five largest banks from 2011 until 2013.  
 
 
Chart 14 Total capital ratio for the five largest Norwegian banks. Percent. Year-end 2013 (Annual reports)  
 
NONG is the only bank that satisfied the required ratio of 12.5 percent already in 2011. 
The DNB Bank Group did not reach the sufficient level of total capital by July 1st 2013, 
when the requirement came into effect. However, in the third quarter of 2013, the five 
largest Norwegian banks could all report that they are adequately capitalized in 
compliance with current requirements.  
 
The historical development in the banks’ capital adequacy speaks to their ability to 
adapt to and fulfill regulatory requirements. So far, the transition to higher capital 
requirements have been made primarily through retained earnings and equity issues.  
 
Chart 15 shows the contribution to changes in the CET 1 ratio from 2009 until 2013, 
from changes in risk-weighted assets and changes in CET 1 capital. The column farthest 
to the right shows the total contribution, where it is evident that increase in the CET 1 
capital represents the majority, approximately 90 percent.  
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Chart 15 CET 1 Contribution to changes in banks’ 1) CET 1 capital ratio. Percentage points 2009-2013 (Norges 
Bank (4), 2014) 
1) Weighted average for the six largest Norwegian banking groups: DNB Bank, Nordea Bank Norge, Sparebank 
1 SR-Bank, Sparebanken Vest, Sparebank 1 SMN  and Sparebank 1 Nord-Norge.  
 
FSAN anticipate banks, in the future as previously, to retain significant portions of their 
profits. Norges Bank (2013) expects that banks can increase their core tier capital-
coverage by up to 1 percentage point per year while maintaining lending, using retained 
earnings to build capital.  
 
Bank’s adaption to higher capital requirements has received much attention in the 
media. The newspapers have been writing about how the banks’ customers pay higher 
interest rates on their mortgages, while the investors continue to gain dividend 
payments and the management is paid significant bonuses. Customers complain that 
banks are using the regulatory tightening as an excuse to raise interest rates. The banks 
on the other hand criticize Norway’s regulatory scheme which they state is stricter than 
that of our neighboring countries and makes the cross-country competition unfavorable 
for Norwegian banks.  
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AsNorway’s largestbank, the DNBBankGroup hasbeenfeatured in the news frequently.
DNB’sCEOhasstated that an equity issueis out of the question, and that retaining
earningsis the only way for the bank to increaseits capital adequacy.In the following
part 3 of the thesis,I conducta casestudy of DNBand look into how the bank has
adaptedto the new capital requirements. Furthermore, I usea financial model to project
the capital adequacyof the bank until 1 July2016,when all the changesto the capital
regulatory framework havecomeinto effect.
3 Casestudy – The DNBBank Group
TheDNBGroupis Norway's largest financial servicesgroup and oneof the largest in the
Nordic region in terms of market capitalization. TheDNBGroupoffers a full rangeof
financial services,including loans,savingsand advisory services,insuranceand pension
products for retail and corporate customersand the public sector.SeeChart16 (DNB
Group,2012).
Chart 16 DNB legal structure as of year-end 2012, (DNB Group, 2012 and Kristiansen, 2013)
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This case study is limited to the DNB Bank Group, which comprises the parent company 
DNB Bank ASA and its subsidiaries, marked in the grey boxes in Chart 16 above. Other 
companies owned by DNB ASA, including DNB Livsforsikring and DNB Asset 
Management, are not part of the banking group and are thus not a part of the analysis.  
 
3.1 The DNB Bank Group 
DNB Bank ASA is a subsidiary of DNB ASA and part of the DNB Group. DNB Bank ASA 
and its subsidiaries, together labeled the DNB Bank Group, comprise DNB ASA’s 
Norwegian and international banking activities (DNB Bank Group, 2012). The same 
capital adequacy requirements from the Norwegian authorities apply to the banking 
group and to the entire DNB Group.  
 
I have chosen to base my analysis on the consolidated financials of the DNB Bank Group, 
in order to capture the assets in the subsidiaries of DNB Bank ASA. DNB Boligkreditt and 
DNB Næringskreditt are two subsidiaries that are especially important for the analysis, 
as the residential mortgages and corporate loans of the bank are mainly kept on the 
books of these specialized credit institutions.  
 
Specialized credit institutions 
In anticipation of the favorable legal framework for Norwegian covered bonds, DNB 
Boligkreditt was established as a subsidiary of DNB Bank ASA in 2005. The subsidiary 
operated as a financial company until it applied for permission to operate as a mortgage 
institution when the final rules came into effect in 2007. Based on developments in 
international capital markets, DNB Boligkreditt has come to play a key role in ensuring 
long-term favorable funding for the Group (DNB Boligkreditt, 2013). At end-September 
2013, DNB Boligkreditt had total assets of NOK 570.2 billion under management. 
 
DNB Næringskreditt is the DNB Group’s vehicle for the issue of covered bonds based on 
commercial mortgages. In 2009, the company was granted a concession pursuant to the 
Financial Institutions Act, which governs the issue of covered bonds, and initiated 
operations in the third quarter of the same year. At end-September 2013, the company’s 
loan portfolio totaled NOK 22.1 billion. 
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The main difference between the financial statements of DNB Bank ASA and the 
consolidated financial statements of the banking group is the size of the risk-weighted 
assets. As the financials of DNB Bank ASA do not include the assets of the subsidiaries, 
the risk-weighted assets are much lower and the capital adequacy therefore 
substantially higher. In the fourth quarter of 2013 the total capital ratio of DNB Bank 
ASA was 1.6 percentage points higher than that of the DNB Bank group. For the purpose 
of evaluating capital adequacy it is imperative to include the subsidiaries’ assets. 
 
Even though the consolidated financial statements of the banking group are used as 
basis for the analysis, it is the overall strategy of DNB ASA that determines the 
development of DNB Bank ASA and its subsidiaries. When I address strategic factors, it 
is assumed that the banking group assumes the same corporate strategic goals as 
communicated by DNB ASA. 
 
In the following, DNB refers to the DNB Bank Group.  
 
3.2 Adaption to higher capital requirements 
In the Basel III capital framework there are three capital ratios that DNB must calculate 
and report to the FSAN; the CET 1 capital ratio, the Tier 1 capital ratio and the Total 
capital ratio, see equation 4, 5 and 6 respectively.  
 
Equation 4, CET 1 capital ratio (BCBS, 2010) 
 
ܥܧܶͳܴܽݐ݅݋ ൌ
ܥܧܶͳ
ܴ݅ݏ݇ െܹ݄݁݅݃ݐ݁݀ܣݏݏ݁ݐݏ
 
 
 
Equation 5, Tier 1 capital ratio (BCBS, 2010) 
 
ܶ݅݁ݎͳܴܽݐ݅݋ ൌ
ܥܧܶͳ ൅ ܣ݀݀݅ݐ݅݋݈݊ܽݐ݅݁ݎͳ
ܴ݅ݏ݇ െܹ݄݁݅݃ݐ݁݀ܣݏݏ݁ݐݏ
 
 
Equation 6, Total capital ratio (BCBS, 2010) 
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ܶ݅݁ݎͳ ൅ ܶ݅݁ݎʹ
ܴ݅ݏ݇ െܹ݄݁݅݃ݐ݁݀ܣݏݏ݁ݐݏ
 
There are roughly two ways for DNB to boost the capital ratios; 1) increase the 
numerator or 2) decrease the denominator of the capital ratio ሺÞǡ ʹͲͳ͵ሻ. The 
denominator is the size of the risk-weighted assets, which is the same for all three 
equations, while the numerator changes as it consists of different categories of capital.  
 
In the following, different methods for adjusting to higher capital requirements will be 
presented, and I will look into how DNB has adapted its behavior in order to build 
capital.  
 
3.2.1 Increasing the numerator 
The numerator can be increased through an equity issue, decreasing dividend payout 
and increasing earnings (Vikrøen, 2013). This will raise the amount of CET 1 capital that 
the bank holds, thereby increasing both equation 4, 5 and 6, assuming that risk-
weighted assets are kept fixed. Equation 5 and 6 can further be increased through 
issuing subordinated debt capital that qualifies as Additional Tier 1 capital or Tier 2 
capital.  
 
Chart 17 shows the development in the different categories of capital of DNB Bank 
Group, in NOK million. 
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Chart 17 CET 11), additional tier 1 and tier 2 capital. DNB Bank Group. NOK million. Q4 2010–Q4 2013 
(Quarterly reports DNB Bank Group, Kristiansen) 
1) Capital for Q1, Q2 and Q3 includes 50 percent of profits for the year. Q4 includes 100 percent of annual 
profits. 
 
The CET 1 capital represents the majority of the total capital of the bank. From Chart 17 
it can be shown that the level of the CET 1 capital in DNB has increased from Q4 2010 to 
Q4 2013. In the same time period, the additional Tier 1 capital has been reduced while 
the amount of Tier 2 capital is about the same in Q4 2013 as in Q4 2010. This 
development could indicate that DNB Bank Group has focused primarily on building CET 
1 capital, and that issuance of subordinated debt capital has not been used to build 
capital up until this point.  In the following, I will therefore look into how the CET 1 
capital has been increased.  
 
3.2.1.1 Equity issue 
It could be argued that issuing stock or equity capital certificates is the most efficient 
way of increasing the capital adequacy of a bank, as equity issuance makes it possible for 
banks to rapidly satisfy increased capital requirements without having to reduce lending 
(Norges Bank (2), 2013). DNB strengthened its capital base by NOK 13.9 billion through 
an equity issue in the fourth quarter of 2009. The banking group had a Tier 1 capital 
ratio of 8.4 percent and a capital adequacy ratio of 11.4 percent at year-end 2009, 
compared with 6.9 and 9.9 percent, respectively in 2008. However, since the new Basel 
III capital framework has been introduced and the plan for increasing the CET 1 ratio 
requirement in Norway was approved, the bank has not issued additional equity and is 
not planning to do so. 
 
DNB is both a savings bank and a private limited company, hence minimum 10 per cent 
of the banks stock must be owned by a savings bank foundation. In the case of an equity 
issue, the DNB savings bank foundation has to buy shares amounting to its initial 
ownership ratio of 10 percent in order to avoid being diluted. If the foundation’s 
ownership is diluted, DNB loses its status as a savings bank. The foundation has a clear 
strategy for their ownership, and states that share placements should only be used in 
the case of extraordinary capital needs, such as specific growth initiatives or major 
structural changes (Sparebankstiftelsen, 2013). As savings banks are subject to specific 
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requirements regarding ownership structure, one can claim that it could be more 
difficult to raise capital through an equity issue, compared to other companies. A list of 
the twenty largest shareholders of the DNB Group is found in appendix 
 
DNB is by far the largest bank in Norway, and the third largest company on the Oslo 
Stock exchange, measured by market capitalization (Oslo Børs, 2013). The bank does 
not only compete for investors in the Norwegian banking sector; because of its size and 
scope, DNB’s primary competitors for investors are major Nordic bank groups. Rune 
Bjerke, CEO of the DNB Group, is concerned that the bank will lose investors to Swedish 
bank groups with more relaxed capital requirements, if the bank issues equity (Haugen, 
2013). On a press conference in March 2013 the bank’s CFO, Bjørn Erik Næss, claimed 
there would be a drop in the share price if the bank were to ask investors for more 
equity (TDN Finans, 2012).   
 
According to the Pecking Order theory11 a share price drop is to be expected when a 
company announces an equity issue. However, the situation of a bank issuing equity to 
fulfill capital requirements is rather specific as issuing debt capital is not an option. 
Furthermore, the capital raised is retained at low interest rates rather than invested in 
future growth prospects. From a shareholder’s point of view, an equity issue could mean 
that investors contribute with more capital without receiving increased returns, which 
implies that current shareholders will not participate in an equity issue unless it is done 
at a substantial discount. 
 
As outlined in the discussion above, there are several factors for DNB to take into 
account when evaluating whether to do an equity issue or raise capital by other means. 
DNB has made the decision to communicate that there will not be an equity issue in the 
period ahead. The bank maintains that the responsibility it has towards its investors 
makes it difficult to issue equity.  
                                                        
11 The Pecking Order theory is a generic theory in finance, which seeks to explain the share price drop on 
the announcement of an equity issue. It is presumed that managers know more about the value of the firm 
than potential new investors do. Asymmetric information creates an adverse selection problem that can 
explain the existence of a price drop when an equity issue is announced. Since managers act in the 
interests of existing shareholders, there is an incentive to sell new equity when it is overvalued. Thus, 
selling equity on average conveys negative information about the firm, and the stock price drops at the 
equity issue announcement (KILDE?) 
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3.2.1.2 Payout policy 
DNB ASA receives group contributions from DNB Bank Group and DNB Bank ASA, and 
dividends are distributed to shareholders by the parent company, DNB ASA. In the 
analysis of the dividends, it is therefore relevant to look at the dividend policy of the 
parent. 
 
The long-term payout ratio target in the DNB Group is 50 percent of net profits (DNB 
Group, 2012). However, in order to increase its capital adequacy the DNB Group has 
decreased its payout ratio. In 2009, 2011 and 2012 the shareholders have had to accept 
significantly lower payouts. In 2010, the bank paid a dividend of 46.2 percent, but 
because of the new regulatory requirements, the Board of Directors reduced the 
proposed dividend to 25 per cent in 2011, see Chart 18.  
 
 
Chart 18, EPS for the entire DNB Group divided into retained earnings and dividends in NOK (Annual reports)  
 
In order to strengthen the CET 1 capital, the dividend payout ratio is expected to be kept 
below the long-term payout target for a period up to and including 2016. Rune Bjerke 
has been criticized for not reducing the dividends payout ratio below 25 per cent, as 
there is a need to build equity capital. Critics argue that the customers are paying for the 
capital build-up through higher mortgage rates, and that investors should contribute to 
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a larger extent. However, Bjerke highlights the importance of maintaining a certain 
percentage of payout. 
 
“If you compare our dividends to selected Swedish banks, you will find that they pay 
three times as much as we do. People must not forget that we are not only competing for 
the same customers, but also for the same investors”, says Rune Bjerke to E24 
(Framstad, 2013) 
 
This was also highlighted when the bank presented the fourth quarter results for 2013, 
and Rune Bjerke indicated that there would be increased dividend payouts in 2014. 
 
3.2.1.3 Increase earnings 
In order to strengthen capital adequacy and meet current and future capital 
requirements, the DNB Bank Group has raised lending rates. As described earlier, the 
Norwegian banking sector has seen an extraordinary increase in earnings in the past 
year. A low key policy rate and ample access to market funding has made it possible For 
DNB to increase the net interest margin, see Chart 19.  
 
 
Chart 19 Total interest income and expense in NOK million and the net interest margin in percent. DNB Bank 
Group Q3 2010 – Q4 2013 (Quarterly reports, DNB Bank Group)  
 
In addition to increasing the net interest margin, the banking group has reduced the 
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number of full-time positions in DNB by more than 1 000, since the second quarter of 
2012. This is an important contribution to bringing down costs and meeting the capital 
requirements through an increase in profits. DNB states that the downsizing will 
continue, with an aim to reduce staff by an additional 500 full-time positions by 2015. 
Additionally, DNB has reduced the number of branch offices and concentrated the 
business to fewer geographical locations. 
 
At the Capital Markets Day in London November 21st 2013, DNB’s CEO reported to the 
market that the bank is on track to meet previously announced cost initiatives and sees 
even further potential for cost savings. “Due to the new banking reality and regulatory 
environment, every manager and employee in DNB is working to optimize our use of 
capital and increase our profitability” Rune Bjerke said (DNB Group, 2013). 
 
3.2.2 Reducing the denominator 
In order for a bank to increase its capital adequacy it can also reduce the denominator of 
the capital ratio, namely risk-weighted assets.  The level of the risk-weighted assets in 
DNB has remained relatively stable the last three years. In the same period, total assets 
have increased by roughly 33 percent, which means that the ratio of risk-weighted 
assets to total assets has decreased in the period. This could indicate that DNB has 
increased lending to customers groups that are considered less risky. See Chart 20.  
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Chart 20 Risk-weighted assets and total assets in NOK billion, and risk-weighted assets to total assets in 
percent Q1 2011 – Q4 2013 (Quarterly reports, DNB Bank Group)  
 
3.2.2.1 Reduce lending 
By reducing overall lending growth, the bank can reduce the level of the risk-weighted 
assets. From Q1 2011 to Q1 2013, the compound quarterly growth rate in loans to 
customers was 1.40 percent. This rate has been more than cut in half the last year (Q1 
2013- Q4 2013) to a quarterly growth rate in loans to customers of 0.61 percent. This 
could be an indication of a reduction in overall lending from DNB Bank.  
 
A portion of this decrease in lending growth can probably be explained by a somewhat 
reduction in credit demand in 2013 (FSAN, 2013). But, as DNB’s market share in the 
credit market has decreased during the period, it could be reasonably assumed that the 
bank has reduced the lending growth. At year-end 2012, DNB had a 31.4 percent market 
share of total gross lending in Norway, while at year-end 2013 the marked share had 
decreased to 30.3 percent, see table 1.  
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Table 1 Gross lending in Norway as of December 31, group figures, the five largest banks (Finance Norway, 
2013) 
 
Banks can also reduce the value of risk-weighted assets by decreasing lending in the 
loan categories with higher risk weights. If the bank at the same time increases lending 
to the loan categories where the risk weights are lower, the total volume of lending will 
not have to decline substantially even though the value of the risk-weighted assets do.  
 
The risk weights applied to the different loan categories are not made public, but DNB 
reports the non-performing and doubtful loans and guarantees per loan category. For 
the purpose of a back-of-the-envelope analysis, the ratio of non-performing and doubtful 
loans and guarantees to the total value of loans per category could serve as an indication 
of risk for each loan category. Table 2 displays this ratio per loan category and the 
growth in total lending per growth category.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No. Top 5 banks NOKm Market share NOKm Market share
1 DNB Bank Group 1,050,093        30.27 % 1,035,316        31.39 %
2 Nordea Bank Norge 463,854           13.37 % 455,538           13.81 %
3 Handelsbanken 182,800           5.27 % 179,450           5.44 %
4 Danske Bank 170,900           4.93 % 175,226           5.31 %
5 SpareBank 1 SR-Bank 158,383           4.56 % 157,468           4.77 %
Total 2,026,030        58.4 % 2,002,998        60.7 %
2013 2012
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Loan category Bad to total 
loans Q4´13 
Credit 
growth 
Q4´12-Q4´13 
Share of 
total lending 
Q4´13 
    Private individuals 1,0 % 3,9 % 50,2 % 
Transportation by sea and pipelines and vessel construction 4,8 % -2,6 % 9,2 % 
Real estate 2,9 % 2,0 % 14,1 % 
Manufacturing 4,1 % 24,4 % 4,3 % 
Services 1,5 % -3,9 % 5,3 % 
Trade 2,1 % -3,9 % 2,5 % 
Oil and gas 0,4 % 11,7 % 1,9 % 
Transportation and communication 3,6 % 1,8 % 2,5 % 
Building and construction 3,1 % 9,6 % 3,5 % 
Power and water supply 0,3 % -0,4 % 2,2 % 
Seafood 0,5 % 2,5 % 1,4 % 
Hotels and restaurants 3,4 % 41,1 % 0,7 % 
Agriculture and forestry 2,1 % -12,6 % 0,6 % 
Central and local government 0,0 % 13,1 % 0,6 % 
Other sectors 0,4 % -2,8 % 0,8 % 
Table 2 Gross non-performing and doubtful loans and guarantees (“bad loans”) to total amount of loans and 
guarantees (“total loans”) per loan category, and growth in total lending (DNB Group, 2014) 
 
The category “Transportation by sea and pipelines and vessel construction”, which is 
mainly shipping related and “Manufacturing” both have a ratio of bad loans to total loans 
to the category above 4 percent. The large differences in the volume of loans per 
category makes it difficult to compare these ratios, however they do provide an 
indication of the risk. DNB has stated that the bank will aim to reduce exposure to the 
shipping segment as a step towards reducing the risk-weighted assets. From Table 2 it 
can be shown that lending to this category has decreased in the period Q4 2012-Q4 
2013, which supports the statement made by DNB.  
 
It could be reasonably assumed that DNB has both reduced the overall lending growth 
as well as making an effort to reduce new lending to the customer categories that 
represent a greater risk of default.  
 
3.2.2.2 Sell assets 
By selling assets, the bank can both decrease the value of the risk-weighted assets and 
increase earnings, both of which increase the capital adequacy of the bank.  
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As a large financial services group, DNB will engage in M&A activities regardless of the 
regulatory regime. Table 3 shows an overview of the M&A activities of the bank in the 
period 2012-2014 year-to-date. 
 
 
 
Table 3 DNB Bank´s M&A activities 2012-2014 ytd (annual reports) 
 
It seems like the bank has been selling off assets rather than making new investments in 
more recent time. Although the capital adequacy requirements might not be the reason 
behind the sale of these assets, it could probably be an explanation of the lack of 
expansionary investments by the bank. As there is a need for capital build up, and 
dividend payments already have been cut in half, it could be reasonably assumed that 
the banks investors would not appreciate investments that would directly influence the 
bank´s ability to distribute earnings.  
 
In the pursuit of higher capital ratios, and a higher CET 1 capital ratio in particular, DNB 
has adapted its behavior and made strategic changes. The bank has reduced dividend 
payout below the long-term goal, which enables DNB to retain more earnings. 
Furthermore, the bank has made efforts to reduce the operational costs by reducing the 
number of employees and branches. In order to reduce the growth in risk-weighted 
assets, the bank has reduced lending growth and adjusted its loan portfolio towards loan 
Year M&A activity 
2012 DNB Bank Group entered into an agreement to sell the branch network in 
Poland 
2012 DNB Bank Group entered into an agreement to sell its wholly-owned 
Swedish subsidiary SalusAnsvar AB  
2012 DNB Bank Group’s shares in Nordisk Tekstil Holding AS, which were 
acquired in 2009, were sold at a profit after a successful restructuring 
process  
2013 The Swedish real estate broking company Svensk Fastighetsförmedling AB 
was sold in December 2013 
2014 DNB has entered into an agreement to sell its shares in Nets Holding A/S to 
a consortium of Advent International, ATP and Bain Capital.  
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categories with lower risk weights. Additionally, the financials indicate that DNB has 
been selling assets where the profits have been used to boost capital adequacy.  
 
Based on the above discussion and analysis, DNB have made several adjustments in 
order to build the required capital. However, the bank’s CEO maintains that an equity 
issue is not an option. In the following section I project the financials of DNB Bank Group 
with the objective of answering the research question; 
 
Will DNB be able to meet the capital requirements by July 1st 2016 without issuing equity? 
 
3.3 Projected Capital Adequacy  
3.3.1 Time Horizon 
In order to analyze the development in the capital adequacy of the DNB Bank Group, I 
have built a model that I use to predict the future development in the income statement, 
balance sheet and risk-weighted assets from Q1 2014 until Q2 2016. DNB reports its 
financials quarterly, which makes quarterly data easily accessible. The analysis becomes 
more detailed by applying quarterly data instead of annual data, and makes it easier to 
analyze the development in capital adequacy up until the date when the last scheduled 
capital requirement is introduced, namely July 1st 2016.  
 
When projecting financials it is customary to use a longer period of historical data. If 
there is not a known exit date when the firm is being sold or dissolved, the trends 
applied in the financial projections should be representative of the development with an 
infinite time horizon, which makes it important to use historical data that is normalized 
and represents ordinary operational activities.  
 
In this analysis however, the ordinary operational activities are not the objective for 
analysis; it is the recent changes made by DNB that are relevant. 
 
After the Norwegian Banking sector was hit by the international financial crisis in 2009, 
banks have had to make major changes in order to ensure a functioning market. The 
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uncertainty about international and Norwegian banking regulation has affected banks’ 
behavior in general and DNB specifically, as Norway´s largest bank. DNB has worked 
continuously to adapt to the frequent speculation about, and introduction of, new capital 
requirements and regulations. Because of this, the bank’s financials from some years 
back do not provide relevant information about the future. Changes with long-term 
effects have been made, that make financials from five years back outdated. Normalized 
data that portray the historical “ordinary operational activities” are not relevant for the 
analysis in this thesis.  
 
When projecting the future development of DNB Bank Group I believe it to be more 
accurate to base my assumptions on more recent data, especially as the projection 
period is only two and a half years ahead rather than indefinite. I have therefore chosen 
to use the last three years as a historical basis for the projection. 
 
Due to the short projection period from Q4 2013 until Q2 2016 and the clearly stated 
regulatory changes to be implemented during that period, I find it reasonable to assume 
that DNB’s market conditions will not change significantly during the projection period.  
 
As the DNB Bank Group has had knowledge about the capital requirements before they 
came into effect and knows about the scheduled further tightening of the regulation, it is 
assumed that there is no sudden drop in credit supply as a response to the new 
requirements being phased in.  
 
3.3.2 Customer base  
The DNB Bank Group divides its customers into four main customer segments; personal 
customers, small and medium-sized enterprises, large corporate and international 
customers, and trading (DNB Bank Group, 2013). 
 
Personal Customers is a segment that comprises a wide range of products to private 
customers sold through the distribution network in Norway.  
 
Small and Medium-sized Enterprises comprise product sales and advisory services to 
small and medium-sized enterprises in Norway.  
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The segment of Large Corporate and International Customers includes both Norwegian 
and international corporate customers as well as all customers served by DNB’s 
subsidiary banks in the Baltics, Poland and Russia. In May 2013, the portfolio in Poland 
comprising personal customers and small and medium-sized enterprises was 
transferred to a Polish bank. The transaction also entailed the transfer of 38 branch 
offices and approximately 250 employees. The transfer is a consequence of the decision 
to focus on the largest corporate customers in the Polish market.  
 
Finally, Trading includes market making and other trading activities in fixed income, 
currencies and commodities as well as equities. 
 
Chart 21 shows the net loans (to the left) and deposits (to the right) divided by segment 
for 2013.  
 
 
Chart 21 Net loans (to the left) and deposits (to the right) the DNB Bank Group year-end 2013, by segments 
(DNB Bank Group, 2013) 
 
The segment mix has been relatively stable over the past few years. DNB has not 
communicated any change in the overall strategy that would imply a different mix in the 
years to come. In the model it is assumed that the ratio of each segment to the total 
customer base remains fixed throughout the projection period.  
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I base the financial projections on the notion that the financials from the historical 
period of 2011 until 2013 forms a good basis for making assumptions about the future 
development of the DNB Bank Group. 
 
3.3.3 Projected Balance Sheet 
Chart 22 shows the summarized balance sheet of DNB Bank Group as of year-end 2013. 
Loans to customers make up the majority of the bank’s assets with roughly 63 percent of 
total assets. On the liabilities side, ‘customer deposits’ is a major item representing 
roughly 42 percent of total liabilities in Q4 2013. ‘Debt securities’ is another major item, 
representing 34 percent of total liabilities. In the projection model, these major items 
are key drivers of the growth of the bank’s balance sheet as they represent the majority 
of the total. They are also key drivers for the bank’s net interest income.  
 
The smaller balance sheet items on both the asset and liabilities side have been summed 
up into two items; other assets and other liabilities respectively. The summarized 
version of the balance sheet shown in Chart 22 forms the basis for the projected 
financials.  
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Chart 22 DNB Bank Group’s balance sheet as of year-end 2013, summarized version (Q4 financial report), 
Other assets include shareholdings, investment property, investment in associated companies, intangible 
assets, deferred tax assets, assets held for sale and other assets. Other liabilities include payable taxes, 
deferred taxes, other liabilities, liabilities held for sale, provisions and pension commitments. 
 
Table 4 below shows the assumptions applied for the projection of the balance sheet. 
These assumptions will be explained further in the following sections.  
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Table 4 Assumptions about the future development in DNB Bank Group’s balance sheet. Figures in percent
represent the compound quarterly growth rate in these items from Q1 2011 until Q4 2013.
A completeoverview of the forecastedbalancesheetcanbe found in the appendix.
3.3.3.1 Assets
Cashanddepositswith centralbanks
Cashand depositswith central banks include cashand depositswith NorgesBankand
central banksoutside Norway,mainly in OECDcountries (DNBBankGroup,2013).
At year-end 2013 the amount held at NorgesBank totaled NOK7,365million.
In the historical period of 2011-2013, the item cashand depositswith central banks,has
beenfluctuating in a rangefrom NOK16 to 433 billion. For the projection period I have
assumeda fixed amount going forward, equal to the averagesizeof the bank’s cashand
deposits with central banks in the historical period.
Duefrom credit institutions
This item includes short term lending in the interbank market in addition to the bank’s
depositswith credit institutions with no agreedperiod of notice.Like the cashand
depositswith central banks,the amount due from credit institutions is an item that has
Assets Projection method Liabilitiesand equity Projection method
Cash and depositswith central banks Fixed avg1Q11-4Q13 Due to credit institutions Fixed 4Q13
Due from credit institutions Fixed avg1Q11-4Q13 Deposits from customers 1,10 %
Loansto customers 1,10 % Financial derivatives Avg1Q11-4Q13
Commercial paper and bonds Fixed 4Q13 Debt securities issued 0,13 %
Financial derivatives Avg 1Q11-4Q13 Other liabilities 5,48 %
Other assets 1,85 %
Additional cash Residual Subordinated loan capital Target: 3.5%of RWA
Share capital Fixed
Share premium reserve Fixed
Other equity
Other equity OB
+ Profit
- dividends
=Other equity CB
Total assets 0,91 % Total liabilit ies and equity 0,91 %
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fluctuated quite a lot historically. For the projection period I have assumed a fixed 
amount going forward, equal to the historical average size of this balance sheet item.  
 
Loans to customers 
Loans to customers is a major item on the bank’s balance sheet, and consist of the bank’s 
lending to all customer groups, as presented in Table 2. On average in the historical 
period, roughly 65 percent of DNB’s assets consist of loans to customers. The growth in 
total assets is therefore closely linked to the growth in DNB’s lending, which is affected 
by the overall credit growth in the economy and the loan losses and impairment. 
 
Credit growth 
Overall credit growth in Norway was reduced somewhat through 2013, but it still 
remains higher than growth in the mainland economy, see K2 in Chart 23. Household 
debt accounts for 58 percent of domestic debt, and since 2011 the credit growth has 
remained steady at about 7 percent on an annual basis (FSAN (1), 2013), see Chart 24. 
Although the growth in house prices is expected to decline somewhat in the period to 
2016, dwellings will probably continue to sell at higher prices, contributing to prolonged 
growth in household indebtedness. However, the introduction of tighter home mortgage 
lending practice, through the increased LGD ratio for mortgage assets pulls in the 
opposite direction.  
 
  
Chart 23 (to the left), twelve-month growth in; the general public´s gross domestic debt (yellow line), the debt 
of mainland Norway (pink line) and the GDP of mainland Norway (purple line). Chart 24 (to the right), twelve-
month growth of debt to; municipalities (pink line), non-financial corporations (yellow line) and households 
(purple line) (FSAN, 2014) 
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Norges Bank projects a slight decrease in household credit demand in the near future, 
see Chart 25. 
 
 
 
 
Chart 25, Household saving and net lending as a share of disposable income, percent, 1993-20171 
1) Projections for 2014-2017 (broken lines) (Norges Bank , 2014) 
 
The growth in credit to enterprises has also come down since the first quarter of 2012, 
see Chart 22. The fourth Monetary Policy Report issued by Norges Bank in 2013 point to 
weak, but somewhat higher growth in investment in Mainland Norway in the next 
couple of years. The increased activity could bring continued growth in credit to firms.  
However, enterprises have, to a greater degree than previously, obtained funding in the 
bond markets. While Norwegian enterprises mainly obtained bank financing in previous 
years, there was a clear shift in 2013 towards Norwegian and foreign bond markets. 
Risk premiums in the markets have fallen, thus it has been more beneficial for some 
companies to use these sources. If this trend continues, it could imply a further 
reduction in the growth in bank lending to enterprises. 
 
Loan losses and impairment 
Another key factor in the projection of the value of loans to customers is loan 
impairment. A loan is impaired when it is not likely that the borrower will be able to 
repay the full value of the loan. All banks must register loan impairment to account for 
future losses on loan defaults. The impairment is subtracted from the value of the bank’s 
loans, thus reducing the balance sheet value.  
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The impairment amount is estimated by the bank according to regulatory guidelines. 
The rules for impairment registration have become stricter following the financial crisis, 
when many banks experienced financial distress. Unexpectedly high loan losses with 
insufficient funds to cover them, caused trouble for many banks. Chart 26 displays 
DNB’s impaired loans from 2002 until 2013.  
 
 
Chart 26, Impaired loans (NOKm) (DNB Bank Group, 2013) 
 
In the period 2005-2008, the ratio of DNB’s problem loans to total loans was especially 
low, however the financial crisis caused a new wave of loan losses. The ratio has come 
somewhat down since then, and the high activity levels in the Norwegian economy have 
supported a good income trend and relatively low loan losses in 2011-2013, compared 
to the high levels in 2010. 
 
Projection of loans to customers 
Loans to customers before accounting for the impairment, has seen a quarterly average 
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growth of 1.18 percent from Q1 2011 until Q4 2013. Due to the expected reduction in 
credit growth, I have reduced this growth to 1.10 percent, applying a precautionary 
approach.  
 
Much of DNB’s lending goes to non‐financial firms, and a substantial portion of this 
lending is to commercial property and shipping segments. Both these industries carry 
high risk, as previously mentioned. Risk is also high in the case of bank lending to other 
industries. Historically banks have incurred substantially higher losses on loans to firms 
than on loans to households. A weaker international trend, reduced oil prices, higher 
interest rates and increased unemployment could feed through to higher loan losses in 
banks' corporate portfolios. DNB has enjoyed low loan losses in the past but there is a 
possibility for increased loan losses in the period ahead. However, as the bank has a 
strategy of decreasing its exposure towards the riskier asset classes, the effect of a 
somewhat increase in overall loan losses is assumed neutralized by recoveries on loans 
previously written off in the riskier segments.  
 
Historically (2011-2013), impaired loans have amounted to 1.29 percent of loans before 
impairment. This ratio is applied in the projection period. I estimated the ratio of 
impaired loans, because new impairment that is not covered by the already impaired 
amount or neutralized by recoveries of loans previously written off, is registered as an 
expense in the bank’s profit and loss statement. This is elaborated in the section on the 
income statement below.  
 
Loans to customers equal loans to customers before impairment minus the impaired 
loans for the period.  
 
Commercial paper and bonds 
This item includes both commercial paper and bonds at fair value and commercial paper 
and bonds held to maturity, and represents the bank’s wholesale funding. The average 
quarterly growth rate is -0.45 percent, which indicates that the growth in this item is 
almost zero. Comparing the value of commercial paper and bonds in the first quarter of 
2011 and the fourth quarter of 2013, I find that the value is virtually unchanged. I 
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therefore find it reasonable to project this item as a fixed amount equal to the Q4 2013 
amount going forward.  
 
Financial derivatives 
Financial derivatives are contracts stipulating financial values in the form of interest 
rate terms, exchange rates and the value of equity instruments for fixed periods of time. 
Corresponding contracts stipulating prices on commodities and indexes are also defined 
as financial derivatives. Derivatives include swaps, forward contracts and options as 
well as combinations thereof, including forward rate agreements (FRAs), financial 
futures and agreements on the transfer of securities. Financial derivatives in the DNB 
Bank Group are traded to manage liquidity and market risk arising from the banking 
group's ordinary operations. In addition, the banking group employs financial 
derivatives in its own account trading (DNB Bank Group, 2013). 
 
Financial derivatives are presented as an asset if the market value is positive and as a 
liability if there is a negative market value.  
 
The amount has varied substantially in the historical period, and there is no obvious 
growth trend. The use of a projection that is based on a quarterly growth is therefore 
not a good approach, thus I have kept this item fixed at the historical average in the 
projection period.  
 
Other assets 
Other assets consists of a bulk of items, including shareholdings, investment property, 
investment in associated companies, intangible assets, deferred tax assets, assets held 
for sale and other assets. The average growth rate of this bulk item is 1.9 percent, which 
I find to be a sensible assumed growth rate in the projection period.  
 
Additional cash 
I have added an additional item to the bank’s assets, which can be viewed as an addition 
to the item cash and deposits with central banks. For modelling purposes, the additional 
cash item is projected as a residual that balances the total assets and total liabilities and 
equity.  I used the Solver function in excel in order to derive at the value of this item that 
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balanced the assets and liabilities and equity. In the model it is assumed that the bank 
does not earn any interest on this amount.  
 
3.3.3.2 Total Liabilities and Equity 
Due to credit institutions  
This balance sheet item includes short term debt due to credit institutions and 
borrowings from Norges Bank in connection with the Norwegian government's covered 
bonds exchange scheme in relation to the financial crisis. The funding obtained By DNB 
through this scheme totaled NOK 50.0 billion at year-end 2012.  
 
The amount due to credit institutions has remained fairly stable during the historical 
period, with some fluctuations around the period average. For the projection period the 
item is assumed fixed at the average amount for the period 2011-2013. 
 
Deposits from customers 
Customer deposits are the bank’s largest liability, representing more than 40 percent of 
total liabilities and equity and an important part of the bank’s funding. Historically, there 
has been a consistent growth in deposits. While the growth was substantial in 2011-
2012 at 4.65 percent it has stagnated in 2013 to 2.45 percent. The fact that the growth in 
deposits has decreased could be explained by the decrease in the deposit rates offered 
by DNB.  
 
The general interest level is expected to increase in the projection period. However, if a 
precautionary interpretation is applied, it is sensible to project a lower growth rate in 
deposits in the future period. Additionally, the amount of customer deposits has been 
kept fairly stable at a level slightly below NOK 1,000 billion for the period 2012-2013. 
Projecting further quarterly growth in deposits equal to the growth in lending at 1.10 
percent maintains the amount of deposits from customers close to NOK 1,000 billion 
during the projection period, which I believe to be a decent estimate.  
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Financial derivatives 
On the liability side, the value of financial derivatives has been increasing in the 
historical period, which indicates that the bank holds an increasing amount of negative 
financial derivatives. Even though there has been a growth trend historically, there is no 
indication that this might be the case in future. As the financial derivatives are recorded 
at fair value, meaning that if the market value increases and become positive, that would 
result in the financial derivative becoming an asset, and the liability item would 
decrease correspondingly.  
 
As there has been almost consistent growth in this item historically, projecting the item 
as an average of the entire period would be somewhat misleading. Also, the value 
financial derivatives liabilities increased significantly in Q4 2013, so keeping it fixed at 
that value would not make for a good projection. I therefore assume that the value of the 
item is kept fixed at the average for Q1 2013 to Q4 2013.  
 
See financial derivatives assets, for a detailed description of the item. 
 
Debt securities issued 
Debt securities issued consists of commercial papers and bonds issued by DNB. The item 
increased at a relatively high growth rate in 2011-2012, but the growth has stagnated 
and the average quarterly growth in this item in 2013 was 0.13 percent. I assume that 
the growth recorded in 2013 is more appropriate in projection of the future 
development in the value of debt securities issued. 
 
Other liabilities 
Other liabilities is a bulk item that include payable taxes, deferred taxes, liabilities held 
for sale, provisions, other liabilities and pension commitments. These items collectively 
have seen an average quarterly growth of 5.5 percent from 2011-2013. It is assumed 
that other liabilities will continue to grow at this rate in the projection period. 
 
Subordinated loan capital 
Subordinated loan capital is determined by calculating the target ratio for the 
subordinated capital to total risk-weighted assets in the projection period. A detailed 
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explanation of the computation of this item is given in the capital adequacy section of 
the paper.  
 
Equity  
DNB Bank Group’s share capital and share premium reserve is kept fixed at current 
levels as it is assumed that the bank will not be issuing equity in the time ahead. Other 
equity is determined by taking the opening balance, adding the period’s profits and 
subtracting the period’s dividends.  
 
The DNB Bank Group pays group contribution to DNB Bank ASA every other year, while 
the DNB Group pays out dividends to the shareholders annually. However, in the 
analysis of the capital adequacy of DNB Bank Group I have chosen to assume a quarterly 
dividend payout equal to the DNB Group’s dividend payout ratio of 25 percent, from the 
DNB Bank Group. The long-term payout strategy is 50 percent of earnings per share, but 
I assume that the payout ratio will be 25 percent for the projection period, in order for 
the bank to build equity capital. This has also been communicated by the CEO on several 
occasions, even though he did indicate a possible increase in dividends payouts in 2014. 
As the objective of this thesis is to examine whether the bank will be able to fulfill the 
capital requirements by the second quarter of 2016, I assume the minimum payout ratio 
stated by the CEO of 25 percent. 
 
When banks report capital adequacy quarterly, the FSAN states that only 50 percent of 
the interim profits for the year up until that time can be included in in the calculation of 
the capital ratios. Since taxes and dividends are paid annually, as opposed to quarterly, 
banks have to make adjustments in their calculations in order to present representative 
quarterly capital ratios. The FSAN has decided that 50 percent of the interim profits can 
be included in the quarterly capital adequacy calculations if estimated tax charges and 
dividend payout is less than 50 percent. However, if foreseeable tax and dividend 
amount to more than 50 percent of profits, then the interim profits cannot be included 
in the calculation of capital ratios at all (FSAN, 2009).  
 
The full interim profits can only be included in the calculation of capital ratios if they are 
proved to the satisfaction of the competent authorities that the amount has been 
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evaluated and is net of any foreseeable charge or dividend. The model is built under the 
assumption that DNB will obtain the necessary approval to include the full profits of 
each period, adjusted for the tax and dividends, in the calculation of the capital adequacy. 
 
3.3.4 The Income Statement 
A bank’s profits are hugely dependent on the overall interest level in the economy. For 
the DNB Bank Group, net interest income represents about 80 percent of the bank’s total 
income. This makes the projections for interest income and interest expenses an 
important part of projecting the income statement of the DNB Bank Group.  
 
The fact that the DNB Bank Group has customers in other countries complicates the 
projection of interest income and expenses. In the model I have chosen to use the 
Norwegian 3-month interbank rate, Nibor, as the main driver for the net interest income 
of the banking group. However, the interest levels in other countries are based on these 
countries’ money market rates, and not the Norwegian. Since more than 80 percent of 
the bank’s lending, deposits and interest income stems from Norway, it could be argued 
that the bank’s substantial Norwegian presence makes the simplifying assumption 
reasonable.  
 
3.3.4.1 Interest Income 
The interest income is the interest earned on the bank’s lending activities, defined as the 
interest rate achieved multiplied with the value of the loans. In the model, the interest 
that the bank charges is calculated by a spread to the 3-month Nibor for three main 
categories of loans provided by the bank; amounts due from credit institutions 
(including interest earned on cash and deposits with central banks), commercial paper 
and bonds, and loans to customers.  
 
I project the development in the interest rate charged on these loan categories by 1) 
determining the average interest rate per loan category in 2013, 2) computing the 
average spread of the average interest rate per loan category to the 3-month Nibor and 
3) assuming that the average interest rate will develop with the 3-month Nibor in the 
projection period. 
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1) Approximation of the average interest rate charged 
The interest income for each category is provided in DNB’s historical income statement. 
The average interest rate per loan category is computed by dividing the total annual 
interest income per category in 2013 by the average value of the corresponding balance 
sheet items, representing the average book value of the loan category in 2013, see 
equation 7.  
 
Equation 7 Estimated average interest rate  
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This estimate of the average interest rate charged per loan category does not reflect the 
interest rate actually charged on new loans provided, as the value of the balance sheet 
items are made up of the sum of massive amounts of individual loan contracts. These 
contracts vary in length, and most importantly they vary in the interest rate charged. 
Additionally, a smaller percentage of the total value of the balance sheet items are loans 
provided by the foreign braches of DNB where the interest level would be different form 
the Norwegian interest rates. This means that the approximation of the average interest 
rate charged is mainly purposeful for projection, and will provide any grounds for 
comparison with the interest level in the economy at present or with DNB’s own 
statements of the interest rates charged on new loans provided.  
 
2) Average spread to the 3-month Nibor 
The spread is determined by subtracting the average 3-month Nibor from the average 
interest rate computed per loan category in step 1) above.  
 
For amounts due from credit institutions and commercial paper and bonds, the interest 
spread to the 3-month Nibor is kept constant through the projection period.  
 
For loans to customers, the calculated spread is steadily reduced. This reduction reflects 
the banks’ adaption to the somewhat reduced credit demand. Furthermore, it is 
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assumed that the net interest margin decreases with the level of the market rate, as 
there is an incomplete pass-through from the market rate to retail rates. This 
assumption is supported by the fact that the interest margins on loans to customers in 
the Norwegian banking sector have been exceptionally high for some time now. Most 
banks, including DNB, have increased the interest on loans to customers in order to 
strengthen capital adequacy.  
 
Norges Bank does not believe that the widened interest margins can be maintained in 
the period ahead, without curbing overall credit growth substantially. As shown through 
Chart 5 the difference between the projected interest rate on household credit and 
projected the 3-month Nibor decreases as the projected key policy rate increases. I have 
chosen to use the projected decrease in this spread as a basis for the decrease in DNB 
Bank Group’s interest rate spread on loans to customers.  
 
 
3) Projection of the average interest rate by the expected development in the 3-month Nibor 
Finally, the average interest rate for the projection period is estimated as the spread 
computed in step 2) plus the baseline scenario projection of the 3-month Nibor provided 
by Norges Bank in the first Monetary Policy Report of 2014 (as presented in Chart 5). 
 
In reality, only a fraction of DNB’s loans contracts are directly influenced by the 
fluctuations in the money market rate. This is due to the fact that a substantial amount 
of the loans provided are fixed-rate loans, meaning that DNB earns a fixed interest rate 
independently of the changes in the 3-month Nibor. The percentage of fixed rate loans of 
total lending in DNB is not made publically available.  
 
For modeling purposes, it is assumed that the entire loan portfolio consists of floating 
rate loans, and that changes in the 3-month Nibor in one quarter affects the average 
interest rate on these loans in the same quarter. There is thus an assumption of zero 
time lag between the changes in the 3-month Nibor and the changes in the average 
interest rate charged per loan category. For some short-term loan contracts, this is an 
assumption close to reality. However, for floating rate mortgage loans, there is a 
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regulated time lag which prevents DNB from increasing the rate charged without due 
notice in advance.  
 
The average interest rates computed are denoted annually, and divided by four when 
calculation the interest income per quarter.  
 
Other interest income 
Other interest income is projected as a bulk item that consists of interest on impaired 
loans and guarantees, front-end fees and other interest income, and make up about 3 
percent of total interest income. Other interest income is kept constant through the 
projection period equal to the value of the item in the fourth quarter of 2013. 
 
3.3.4.2 Interest Expenses 
I have used the same method for estimating the interest expenses as for the interest 
income and estimated a spread to the 3-month Nibor. As with the interest income, a 
certain portion of the interest expense will not change with changes in the 3-month 
Nibor because the bank has entered into long-term wholesale funding contracts with 
fixed rates. However, in the model it is assumed that all contracts are affected by 
changes in the interest rate. 
 
Spreads to the 3-month Nibor have been calculated for amounts due to credit 
institutions, debt securities issued, subordinated loan capital and deposits from 
customers. The spreads for the first three categories are held constant, but the interest 
spread on deposits from customers is increased during the projection period. The 
spread estimated in the model is negative (meaning that the computed average interest 
rate is lower than the average 3-month Nibor in 2013). This negative spread is increased, 
which translates into a slower increase in the deposit rate than the increase in the 3-
month Nibor.  
 
As the general interest rate level increase and the bank’s market funding becomes more 
expensive, it is assumed that the bank will have a higher demand for deposits, thus 
raising the rate on deposits. However, given the assumption that income is reduced due 
to the reduced spread on loans to customers, it is reasonable to expect that DNB Bank 
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Group will wish to neutralize the lost income through reducing the funding cost of 
deposits.  
 
With the increased capital adequacy, DNB should theoretically be able to obtain cheaper 
wholesale funding, and the positive spread to Nibor should therefore decrease (and not 
held constant as assumed in the model). This is due to the reduced risk associated with 
the bank when the balance sheet is solidified. With a more solid balance sheet, there is 
less risk for the creditors and they should be willing to offer funding at a lower rate. 
However, looking at Chart 27, which shows the estimated difference in investors 
perception of the risk associated with DNB compared to Swedish peers with lower 
capital adequacy requirements (and therefore lower capital adequacy), and there is 
hardly any difference. The risk difference is estimated by the spreads on Credit Default 
Swaps (CDS’s). The CDS spreads will reflect the likelihood that an individual bank might 
experience financial distress. 
 
 A possible reason for this observation is the relatively stable and sound market 
conditions at the moment. There is generally little risk is lending funds to Nordic banks. 
The difference in solidity would probably materialize if the market conditions worsened. 
In the model it is assumed that it will not do so in the projection period. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chart 27, DNB funding cost compared to Swedish peers (Data series extracted from Reuters Ecowin, Swedish 
average is calculated by the CDS spreads for SEB Bank, Nordea Bank and Svenska Handelsbanken) 
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Other interest expenses 
Other interest expenses is projected as a bulk item that consists of expenses to the 
guarantee fund levy and interest rate adjustments resulting from interest rate swaps 
entered into. This expense item is kept constant through the projection period at the 
amount of the fourth quarter in 2013. 
 
3.3.4.3 Net interest Income 
Lending margins on loans to customers 
Rune Bjerke has presented quarterly profits that greatly exceeded expectations for 
several periods in a row, and both bankers and financial analysts are calling it the golden 
age of banking. The recent earnings in the Norwegian banking sector have been 
astonishing, and above the normal level. All-time high interest margins in DNB Bank 
Group, indicates that the margin has to be normalized in the years to come.  
 
The competition in the mortgage lending market and the small to medium enterprises 
segments is intensifying and lending margins are under pressure. In April DNB 
announced both mortgage rate and deposit reductions. Financial analysts estimate that 
the reduction will have a neutral effect on the net interest income of the bank. 
Reductions in both the average interest rate on loans to customers and the average 
deposit rate is included in the projection period in the model, as specified in section 
3.3.4.1 and 3.3.4.2 above.  
 
In the projection period, the lending margin is kept constant. This assumption is 
supported by the findings in a working paper for Norges Bank by Raknerud, Vatne and 
Rakkestad (2011). They find that banks are facing a downward-sloping demand curve 
for loans and an upward-sloping supply curve for customer deposits. In a perfectly 
competitive market, any increase in marginal funding cost, represented by the 3-month 
Nibor, should be passed through to all retail rates. However, faced with a downward-
sloping demand curve for loans, banks’ balance the positive price effect and the negative 
effect on the demand for loans when increasing their loan rates. Similarly, when faced 
with an upward-sloping supply curve for deposits, banks will take into consideration 
that deposits will decrease when the deposit rate is lowered.  
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Raknerud, Vatne and Rakkestad (2011) find that when the Nibor increases, the margin 
between loan and deposit rates remains unchanged while the spread between the loan 
rate and the Nibor rate decreases. This is line with the assumptions made in the model.  
 
Chart 28 below shows an illustration of the principle applied in the projection model. As 
previously explained, the average interest rates applied in the model are for modeling 
purposes only and provides little value as a basis for comparison with historical data. In 
order to show the above-mentioned changes in the interest margin and spread to the 3-
month Nibor, I have made Chart 28 for illustrative purposes only. 
 
 
Chart 28 Illustration of the historical (Q4 2011 – Q4 2013) and projected (Q1 2014 – Q2 2016) average 
interest rate on lending to customers, deposits from customers and the 3-month Nibor. Note: for illustrative 
purposes only (percent) 
 
Net interest income 
Chart 29 shows the actual interest income margin from Q1 2011 to Q4 2013, and the 
projected interest income margin from Q1 2014 to Q2 2016.  
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Chart 29, Historical (dark blue) and projected (light blue) net interest income and interest income margin  
 
From Chart 29 the historical increase in both the net interest income and interest 
income margin is shown. In the projected period the net interest income continues to 
increase as the balance sheet expands, and the interest rates are increased. However, the 
interest income margin is reduced from Q3 2014 and during the remainder of the 
projection period to a more “normalized” level.  
 
3.3.4.4 Net commission and fee income and other income and expenses 
Net commission and fee income is projected as a ratio to total interest income equal to 
6.8 percent, which is the average ratio to total interest income in the historical period, 
2011-2013.  
 
In the model, net gains on financial instruments, profit from companies, net gains on 
investment property and other income are summed up and labeled total other income. 
This item is projected as a ratio to total interest income. Based on the average of 
historical data from 2011 until 2013, the ratio is projected at 14.4 percent.  
 
Net gains on financial instruments at fair value 
During the first quarter of 2014, an agreement to sell the Group’s shareholding in Nets 
was signed. The transaction is expected to be completed in the second quarter of 2014. 
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Following the agreement, the value of the shareholding in Nets was increased by NOK 
913 million. The increased value of this shareholding was recorded as net gains on 
financial instruments at fair value for Q1 2014 in the projected income statement. In the 
balance sheet the shareholdings item, included in other assets, was reduced by the book 
value of holding at NOK 2,634 million and additional cash was increased by the same 
amount. 
 
Other expenses 
Other expenses are also projected as a bulk item including salaries and other personnel 
expenses, other expenses and depreciation and impairment of fixed and tangible assets. 
This item is also projected as a ratio to total interest income of 31.4 percent, which is the 
historical average of the period from 2011 to 2013. 
 
3.3.4.5 Impairment of loans and guarantees 
The quarterly average impairment cost in DNB’s income statement has been 4.51 
percent of impaired loans historically. It is assumed that the historical average is a 
decent approximation in the future development in the cost of impairment of loans and 
guarantee, and I therefore project this income statement item as 4.51 percent of 
impaired loans in the projection period. 
 
3.3.4.6 Tax 
The Bank Group has operations in a number of countries whose tax rates are different 
from that in Norway. According to Norwegian tax legislation, external interest expenses 
shall be distributed proportionally among operations in Norway and international 
branches based on the respective units’ total assets. This could result in additions or 
deductions from income in Norway. 
 
The nominal tax rate in Norway is 27 percent. Business operations outside Norway are 
subject to varying income tax rates depending on local tax regulations in the relevant 
country. DNB’s operations outside Norway are subject to effective tax rates ranging from 
12 percent to 55 percent. Tax-exempt income from share investments contributes to a 
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lower expected tax rate. In the longer term, the effective tax rate is expected to be 
approximately 26 per cent (DNB Bank Group, 2013).  
 
The effective tax rate is therefore projected at 26 percent in the projection period. 
 
The complete projected income statement can be found in appendix.  
 
3.3.5 Risk-weighted Assets 
The total risk-weighted volume will be affected by the overall expansion in the balance 
sheet, which again in largely determined by credit growth. However, the effect of an 
extended asset base on the value of the risk-weighted assets depends on how the growth 
is distributed across various segments in the portfolio and on the risk weights used to 
compute capital charges per segment. For example, the balance sheet could be 
expanding and the value of the risk-weighted assets could still decrease; if DNB reduced 
exposure to the riskier asset classes, like shipping and replaced them with less risky 
assets like mortgages. This was actually the case in Q2 2012, when the balance sheet 
grew by 0.21 percent and the risk-weighted assets decreased by 0.71 percent.  
 
The calculation of risk-weighted assets is an extensive and complicated process. 
Additionally, it requires more information than what is made publically available. In a 
simplified approach, I have assumed a future growth in risk-weighted assets equal to the 
historical average quarterly growth of 0.79 percent.  
 
A key factor in the calculation of risk-weighted assets is the method used. The 
calculation of the DNB Bank Group’s risk-weighted volume is based on a combination of 
the standardized approach and the IRB approach. The majority of the credit portfolios 
are reported according to the IRB approach, which allows DNB to use the bank’s own 
estimates of risk weights. These are lower than the risk-weights in the standardized 
model. DNB estimates that if the IRB approach had been applied to the entire loan 
portfolio it would have given a reduction in risk-weighted volume of approximately 11 
percent at year-end 2012. However, the Basel I floor rule would have prevented risk-
weighted assets from being reduced below 80 percent of the Basel I level. DNB has 
 85 
applied to the FSAN for permission to use the IRB approach on additional portfolios. 
However, the CRD IV will keep the Basel I floor rule in effect until 2017. It is therefore 
assumed that the bank’s risk-weighted volume not will be reduced by extensive use of 
the IRB approach in the projection period.  
 
The new rule introduced by the Ministry of Finance for the weighting of banks’ 
residential mortgages in capital adequacy calculations implies that the average risk 
weight on these mortgages will increase from 11.3 to 17.8 percent when applying the 
IRB approach (DNB Bank Group, 2013). The change entered into force on 1 January 
2014. It is assumed that DNB does not change the composition of its loan portfolio due 
to the new rule, as the bank has been given notice in advance and therefore has been 
able to adjust over a long period of time.  
 
In an attempt to estimate the effect of the rule on the value of risk-weighted assets, I 
have applied the new risk-weight of 17.8 percent for residential mortgages in the IRB 
model, and used the financials from the fourth quarter of 2013. I find that the new rules 
cause the banking group’s total risk-weighted volume to increase by 5 percent, see table 
5.  
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SPECIFICATION OF RISK-WEIGHTED VOLUME
Nominal 
exposure 31 
Dec 2013
Exposure at 
default 31 Dec 
2013
Risk-weighted 
volume 31 
Dec. 2013
Average 
risk weights 
31 Dec 
2013
New risk 
weight 
residential 
mortgages
Risk-weighted 
volume with 
new rule
Credit risk
IRB approach
Corporate 904,597           732,381           379,528           51.8 % 379,528           
Specialised Lending (SL) 3,865               3,832               1,915               50.0 % 1,915               
Retail  - mortgage loans 619,414           619,414           61,048             9.9 % 17.8 % 110,256           
Retail - other exposures 106,641           87,694             24,800             28.3 % 24,800             
Securitisation 63,087             63,087             29,749             47.2 % 29,749             
Total credit risk, IRB approach 1,697,604       1,506,408       497,040           546,248           
Standarized approach
Central government 137,581           160,021           44                     0.0 % 44                     
Institutions 247,382           102,099           25,456             24.9 % 25,456             
Corporate 292,719           227,767           212,452           93.3 % 212,452           
Retail  - mortgage loans 45,128             42,996             23,331             54.3 % 23,331             
Retail  - other exposures 69,139             35,931             28,119             78.3 % 28,119             
Equity positions 3,630               3,630               3,855               106.2 % 3,855               
Securitisation 3,048               3,048               550                   18.0 % 550                   
Other assets 12,650             12,650             12,650             100.0 % 12,650             
Total credit risk, stadarized approach 811,277           588,142           306,457           306,457           
Total credit risk 2,508,881       2,094,550       803,497           852,705           
Market risk
Position risk, debt instruments 32,619             32,619             
Position risk, equity instruments 1,280               1,280               
Currency risk 2,577               2,577               
Commodity risk 51                     51                     
Total market risk 36,527             36,527             
Operational risk 71,753             71,753             
Deductions 703-                   703-                   
Total risk-weighted volume and capital 
requirements before transitional rule 911,074           960,282           
Additional capital requirements according to 
transitional rule 70,547             70,547             
Total risk-weighted volume 981,621           1,030,829       
Increase in total risk-wighted volume due to new rules % 5.0 %
 
Table 5 Estimated increase in risk-weighted volume of DNB Bank Group (NOKm and %, (DNB Bank Group (2), 
2013) 
 
For the calculation of credit risk, the risk-weighted volume for each asset category is 
found by multiplying the average risk weight by the value of assets at default (Exposure 
At Default, EAD). Adding the market risk and the operational risk to the credit risk gives 
us the total risk-weighted volume of the banking group. The value of the risk-weighted 
volume increases by about NOK 50 billion, which translates into a 5 percent increase. 
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On the basis of these calculations, it is assumed that the new rules will cause the risk-
weighted volume to increase permanently by 5 percent in Q1 2014, which implies an 
assumption that DNB Bank Group does not decrease its lending in order to counter the 
effect of the new rule. From Q1 2014, the risk-weighted volume of DNB Bank Group is 
assumed to be percent of total assets.  
 
3.3.6 Capital Adequacy 
The capital adequacy of the banking group is calculated by dividing common equity 
capital, tier 1 capital and total capital respectively by risk-weighted assets.  
 
3.3.6.1 Common Equity Tier 1 Capital  
The common equity tier 1 capital is calculated by adding the group's share capital and 
other equity and subtracting certain deductions.  
 
The share capital is kept fixed in the projection period, as DNB has expressed that the 
bank will not be raising equity in the period ahead. Other equity is the sum of the share 
premium reserve capital and other equity on the balance sheet, adjusted for profits and 
dividend payments. When DNB calculate the capital adequacy of the banking group for 
the first three quarters of the year, the CET 1 capital is estimated by including 50 
percent of interim profits. In this analysis, however, I have chosen to include 100 
percent of the profits in each quarter and consequently deduct estimated tax and 
assumed a dividend of 25 percent for each period. By applying this calculation I reduce 
fluctuations in the capital ratios, which makes it easier to see the development in the 
capital adequacy of the banking group. 
 
The following items must be subtracted from total equity in order to arrive at equity tier 
1 capital: (a) pension funds above pension commitments, (b) deferred tax assets, (c) 
goodwill and other intangible assets, (d) unrealized gains on fixed assets, (e) 50 percent 
of investments in other financial institutions, (f) 50 percent of expected losses exceeding 
actual losses in IRB portfolios, (g) adjustments for unrealized losses/(gains) on the debt 
recorded at fair value, and finally (h) group contribution, payable.  
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The computation of some of these deductions is very specific, which makes it difficult to 
estimate them when projecting the capital adequacy. Certain simplifications are made in 
order to arrive at the CET 1 capital. The deductions above are kept constant for the 
projection period. There is no observable growth trend in these items historically, which 
supports the simplified assumption.  
 
Quarterly dividends are not subtracted as they are assumed paid in every quarter. 
Dividends are only deducted from the CET 1 capital if they have been estimated by year-
end, and are not actually paid yet.  
 
3.3.6.2 Additional Tier 1 and Tier 2 Capital 
The CFO of the DNB Group has expressed that the bank will continue to issue additional 
capital instruments in the period ahead in order to optimize the capital structure (Næss, 
2013). An optimal capital structure means that additional tier 1 capital is increased to 
1.5 percent of risk-weighted assets, while tier 2 subordinated loan capital is increased to 
2.0 percent of risk-weighted assets.   
 
In the projection model it is assumed that the banking group will increase the perpetual 
subordinated loan capital securities that qualify as additional Tier 1 capital to 1.5 
percent of risk-weighted by Q2 2015. July 1st 2015 is the date when the capital 
requirements are really starting to increase, and the CET 1 capital no longer covers the 
total capital requirements. In order for the additional tier 1 capital to become 1.5 
percent of risk-weighted assets, it has to increase by 29,8 percent each quarter (a 
compound quarterly growth rate). From Q2 2015 until Q2 2016, it is assumed that the 
ratio is kept steady at 1.5 percent.  
 
In the projection model I assume that the DNB Bank Group increase tier 2 subordinated 
capital at a rate that ensures a value of total subordinated capital (additional tier 1 
capital and tier 2 capital) of 3.5 percent of total risk-weighted assets by July 1st 2015. In 
order to reach that target ratio, it is calculated that the quarterly growth in total 
subordinated capital is 8.3 percent. From Q2 2015 until Q2 2016, the ratio is kept at 3.5 
percent. 
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I have used the capital adequacy strategy as a basis for determining the amount of total 
subordinated capital that the DNB Bank Group holds on its balance sheet. In order to 
arrive at the balance sheet value, I have to add-back some deductions. There are certain 
adjustments that are made to the subordinated capital in order to arrive at the 
regulatory tier 2 capital. The adjustments are as follows: (a) 50 percent of investments 
in other financial institutions and (b) 50 percent of expected losses exceeding actual 
losses in IRB portfolios are withdrawn, while (c) 45 percent of unrealized gains on fixed 
assets are added.  
 
These items are kept fixed in the projection period.  
 
The CFO of the DNB Group expects that with the current price level of DNB’s funding, 
subordinated debt and hybrid capital, the positive effects from lower long-term funding 
costs will partly compensate for the negative effects of the higher cost level for 
additional capital instruments. However, as subordinated capital increases so does the 
overall funding cost as this capital is more expensive. In the analysis I assume that the 
average spread to the 3-month Nibor for subordinated debt instruments is kept constant 
in the projection period, which means that the funding cost is determined by the 
development in Nibor. This assumption represents a simplification as the additional tier 
1 capital is more costly than the tier 2 subordinated capital. When the additional tier 1 
capital is increased relative to the tier 2 capital, the total average spread to Nibor should 
increase.  
 
3.3.6.3 Projected capital adequacy of the DNB Bank Group 
The capital adequacy of the DNB Bank Group was projected based on the above specified 
assumptions and analysis. The result is shown in Chart 30 below, which also displays the 
historical capital adequacy of the bank.  Note that the historical numbers include only 50 
percent of interim profits for the first three quarters of each year, while the fourth 
quarter of each year includes full profits for the year. This results in a more volatile 
graph historically. The forecast include 100 percent of interim profits each quarter and 
is therefore a smoother line.  
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Chart 30, Historical and projected capital adequacy ratios (%) and risk-weighted assets, NOKm (annual 
reports)  
 
Given the assumption that DNB will issue the full volume of additional tier 1 capital and 
tier 2 capital which corresponds to 1.5 and 2.0 percent of risk-weighted assets, 
respectively, the bank will have a CET 1 capital ratio of 13.6 percent, a tier 1 capital ratio 
of 15.1 percent and a total capital ratio of 17.1 percent in the second quarter of 2016, 
which is significantly above the regulatory limit.  
 
On the basis of the baseline assumptions presented in this thesis it can be concluded that 
the DNB Bank group will be able to reach the capital requirements of 1 July 2016, 
without having to issue equity capital. 
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RWA Equity Tier 1 capital ratio (%)
Tier 1 capital ratio (%) Total capital ratio (%)
Q1 2012 Q2 2012 Q3 2012 Q4 2012 Q1 2013 Q2 2013 Q3 2013 Q4 2013
CET1(%) 9.30 % 9.70 % 10.00 % 10.50 % 10.40 % 10.60 % 10.80 % 11.42 %
Tier 1 (%) 9.90 % 10.30 % 10.60 % 10.80 % 10.70 % 10.90 % 11.10 % 11.77 %
Total capital (%) 11.90 % 11.90 % 12.30 % 12.40 % 12.00 % 12.30 % 13.10 % 13.88 %
RWA (NOKm) 1,025,601   1,018,316   997,151      984,137      1,003,301   1,009,228   1,004,909   1,004,716   
Q1 2014 Q2 2014 Q3 2014 Q4 2014 Q1 2015 Q2 2015 Q3 2015 Q4 2015 Q1 2016 Q2 2016
CET1(%) 11.88 % 12.08 % 12.29 % 12.49 % 12.68 % 12.88 % 13.07 % 13.26 % 13.44 % 13.62 %
Tier 1 (%) 12.31 % 12.64 % 13.00 % 13.40 % 13.86 % 14.38 % 14.57 % 14.76 % 14.94 % 15.12 %
Total capital (%) 14.36 % 14.68 % 15.03 % 15.42 % 15.86 % 16.38 % 16.56 % 16.74 % 16.91 % 17.09 %
RWA (NOKm) 1,038,971   1,047,177   1,055,449   1,063,786   1,072,188   1,080,657   1,089,193   1,097,796   1,106,467   1,115,207   
HISTORICAL
PROJECTION
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3.3.6.4 Sensitivity analysis  
DNB is able to fulfill the regulatory requirements based on a wide range of assumptions. 
It is valuable to reflect on the impact of different assumptions with regards to the final 
outcome and conclusion of the analysis. Some factors will have a bigger impact than 
others, and I have chosen to look at the following factors in a sensitivity analysis: 
 
- The projected 3-month Nibor  
- The share of impaired loans to total loans to customers 
- The growth in the risk-weighted assets 
- The dividend payout ratio 
 
Chart 31 shows the input for the sensitivity analysis and the corresponding CET 1 
capital ratio in the second quarter of 2016.  
 
 
 
Chart 31, Historical and projected capital adequacy ratios (%) and risk-weighted assets, NOKm (annual 
reports)  
 
Changes in the forecasted 3-month Nibor 
A 10 percent reduction or increase in the Norges Bank’s projection curve for the 3-
month Nibor, results in a 0.12 percent increase or reduction in DNB’s CET 1 ratio. When 
the market rate increases the market funding for the bank becomes more expensive. 
Additionally, the interest margin on loans to customers does not follow the increase in 
the Nibor which makes the income increase on loans to customers less than the interest 
Sensitivity input
High Baseline Low
3-month Nibor - 10% Norges Bank projection + 10%
Impaired loans - 1% 1.29 % + 1%
Risk-weighted assets - 0.5% 0.79 % + 0.5%
Dividend payout ratio - 10% 25 % + 10%
CET 1 ratio output 2Q 2016
High Baseline Low
3-month Nibor 13.74 % 13.62 % 13.50 %
Impaired loans 14.01 % 13.62 % 13.23 %
Risk-weighted assets 14.32 % 13.62 % 12.96 %
Dividend payout ratio 14.00 % 13.62 % 13.24 %
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expense on the market funding, resulting in less retained income and therefore a lower 
CET 1 ratio. The opposite effect occurs in the event of lowered interest rates.  
 
Changes in the level of impaired loans 
If the share of impaired loans to total loans to customers increases, the expense of 
impaired loans in the bank’s income statement increases, and the bank is able to retain 
less profit which reduces the CET 1 ratio. 1 percent increase in impaired loans to total 
loans to customers translates into a 0.39 percent lower CET 1 ratio. If the level of 
impaired loans decreases, then the bank will register recoveries of loans previously 
written off which reduces the expenses of impaired loans and increases profits and the 
CET 1 ratio. 
 
Changes in the growth of risk-weighted assets 
The capital ratios are very sensitive to changes in the risk-weighted assets. A 0.5 percent 
increase in the quarterly growth of the risk-weighted assets translated into a decrease in 
the CET 1 ratio of 0.66 percent. If the quarterly growth in risk-weighted assets decreases 
by 0.5 percent, this results in a 0.7 percent increase in the CET 1 ratio. The increase in 
the CET ratio is larger than the reduction followed by reduced growth of the percent (0.5 
percent). The reason for this is that lower growth in risk weighted assets not only has 
the effect of reducing the denominator in the equation and thus increasing the ratio. 
There is also an income effect of the reduced subordinated capital issued, which is 
relatively more expensive compared to other market funding alternatives. As a limit is 
set for the subordinated loan capital of 3.5 percent of risk-weighted assets, an increased 
growth rate will not increase the amount more than this limit. However, there is no 
lower limit, meaning that decrease in the subordinated loan capital with reduced growth 
in bigger than the increase in subordinated loan capital with increased growth.  
 
Changes in the payout ratio 
When the dividend payout ratio is increased to 35 percent of net income, the CET 1 ratio 
increases by 0.38 percent and a decrease of to 15 percent consequently increase the CET 
1 ratio by the same percentage.  
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Small changes in each individual factor have relatively large impact on the bank’s CET 1 
ratio. The risk-weighted assets have an especially large effect of the capital ratio of the 
bank, and is a key factor for the bank when evaluation how to adapt to increased capital 
requirements. The sensitivity analysis is conducted with the assumption that all other 
factors in the model are kept constant, and I look at changes in only one factor at the 
time. This is an extremely simplified version of reality. However, these factors are 
connected and in a scenario where impaired loans would increase significantly, the risk-
weighted assets would probably increase with the increased overall risk for default. If 
the increase in impaired loans came unexpected, the banks might react by charging each 
other higher interest rates on interbank loans, and the 3-month Nibor would increase. In 
such an event, the dividend payout rate could decrease. It is not likely that there would 
be a significant change in any of the mentioned parameters without this being translated 
into changes in the other parameters. 
 
 This interconnectedness between the key drivers for the bank’s earnings is one of the 
reasons for the increased capital requirements. A shock in only one factor would 
probably not be an issue for a large bank, however trouble seldom comes alone in the 
interconnected international financial markets, as we all witnessed during the global 
financial crisis.  
  
 94 
 
4 Conclusion 
 
The Basel III Capital Accord was introduced as a regulatory response to the financial 
crisis. Lack of sufficient capital requirements for banks was an important lesson learned 
after several financial institutions went bankrupt. The main features of the new 
international regulatory framework, introduced by the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision in 2010, are higher capital requirements and stricter standards for high-
quality capital in banks.  
 
In the first part of this thesis, the third Basel Accord was presented both in an 
international and Norwegian context. Norway was among the first countries to 
introduce the third Basel Accord, and Norwegian banks have been adapting to the 
higher regulatory standards since 2009.  
 
Part 2 of the thesis addressed the Norwegian Banking Sector and studied how 
Norwegian Banks have adapted to the increased capital requirements. Several banks 
have issued equity after the Norwegian implementation plan was approved in June 2013, 
with the final date of implementation being July 1st 2016. It was shown that roughly 90 
percent of the increased CET 1 capital ratio of Norwegian banks was due to increased 
CET 1 capital relative to reduced risk-weighted assets. Part 2 provided the necessary 
backdrop for the case study of the DNB Bank Group in part 3 of the thesis.  
 
As Norway’s largest bank and financial services provider, DNB ASA has been featured 
frequently in the newspapers in connection to the new capital requirements. In part 3, I 
analyzed how the DNB Bank Group has adapted to the new requirements. The analysis 
indicated that the bank has decreased the payout ratio in the short term below the log-
term payout ratio target, the net interest margin has been increased, certain subsidiaries 
have been sold and a number of cost reducing measures have been implemented. 
Additionally, the analysis indicates that the bank has reduced the overall lending in 
addition to limiting exposure towards the riskier asset classes in order to reduce the 
growth in the risk-weighted assets. In other words, the DNB Bank Group made use of 
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every other measure other than issuing equity. This is in line with the statements made 
by the bank’s CEO who has stated that DNB ASA will not issue equity to fulfill higher 
capital requirements.  
 
The ultimate aim of this master thesis has been to answer the following research 
question; Will the DNB Bank Group be able to meet the capital requirements by July 1st 
2016 without issuing equity? 
 
After having projected the financials of the DNB Bank Group based on a wide set of well 
assessed assumptions, I am able to conclude that the DNB Bank Group in fact is able to 
meet the required capital ratios implemented in full in 1 July 2016 without issuing 
equity capital. The wide set of measures implemented by the bank in recent year have 
built a fundament from which the bank is able to build CET 1 capital and increase the 
CET 1 capital ratio, as well as the tier 1 capital ratio and the total capital ratio, without 
issuing equity. Given the assumption that DNB will issue the full volume of additional 
tier 1 capital and tier 2 capital which corresponds to 1.5 and 2.0 percent of risk-
weighted assets, respectively, the bank will have a CET 1 capital ratio of 13.6 percent, a 
tier 1 capital ratio of 15.1 percent and a total capital ratio of 17.1 percent in the second 
quarter of 2016, which is significantly above the regulatory limit.  
 
The sensitivity analysis shows that small changes in key assumptions have great impact 
on the result. The conclusion is based upon baseline assumptions, where some reduction 
in credit demand and a reduced net interest margin is accounted for. However, if the 
market conditions change considerably beyond the factors taken into account in the 
analysis, there will also be a significant change in the capital ratios. The sensitivity 
analysis shed light on the vulnerability of banks when several factors worsen 
simultaneously, which is the main reason for the increased capital requirements. The 
interconnectedness of the financial markets was not sufficiently taken into account in 
the regulatory regime prior to the financial crisis; however the lessons learned have 
been implemented through the Basel III Accord and the CRD IV. I can conclude that 
based on the analysis conducted in this paper, Norwegian banks seem solid and 
prepared for any financial turmoil that the future might hold.  
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